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This report was prepared as part of a global research project financed by the Global
Development Network (GDN) entitled “Understanding Reform.” Since it was launched
in 1999, the Global Development Network has brought together research and policy
institutes from around the world, supporting the production and dissemination of
knowledge about development which can be of use to policy makers and the public. The
goal of this multidisciplinary project was to deepen the understanding of the successes
and failures of various reforms through a cross-country comparison of reform policies
and experiences in different regions. This report is one of thirty country studies
prepared in the “Understanding Reform” project.
The last twenty years have seen a perhaps unprecedented level of economic and
political reform on a global scale. It is our hope that with this report we have made
some contribution to the understanding of the factors underlying the success of reforms
as well as the dangers that face reformers and reforms. We should note that in
discussing the success of reforms, and the factors underlying that success, we have
defined success not only in terms of the degree to which the reformers’ goals were
accomplished by the reforms, but also in terms of the ability of reformers to gain the
acceptance among legislators and the general populace necessary for the
implementation of reforms. We have been interested not only in what makes a reform
“good” in a technical sense, but also in what makes it implementable and sustainable.
Thus, we hope that we have not only deepened the understanding of the Polish
experience in the years since 1989, but also provided some insights which may be of
use for other reform efforts in other countries, perhaps in very different parts of the
globe.
We wish to express thanks to all the persons and institutions who made the
preparation of this report possible, first of all to our interviewees. We would also like
to acknowledge our appreciation to Bogna Urbańska-Jobda, who served as a research
assistant and who arranged, taped and transcribed all the interviews.
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Preface
This report reviews the reform process in Poland in the period 1989-2001, from the
formation of the first non-Communist government to the defeat of right-wing forces in
the 2001 parliamentary elections and the formation of a governing left-wing coalition
of social democrats and the peasants’ party (both of them with roots in the Communist
era). It reconstructs the sequence of reforms, assesses their relative successes, and
focuses on the problem of the stagnation of the reform process at the end of the 1990s.
The report is organized in six sections. The first one is an overview of the whole process
of reforms and provides an outline of its social and political context. The second one
states the hypotheses guiding the research undertaken for this report, at the same time
grounding them in the relevant literature. The next four sections focus on selected areas
– selected key components of the state machinery, stabilization and liberalization,
privatization and enterprise restructuring, and pension system. The report synthesizes
much earlier research on the topic. It also relies on several specially conducted
interviews with individuals who played a key role in or made extensive studies of the
reform process. As some of our interviewees declared a will to remain anonymous, we
disclose only the names of those who gave their explicit consent. 
1.1. The Political Context
Poland – together with other post-communist countries – represents a case of dual
transition to market and democracy that started with the collapse of state socialism in
1989 and the Round Table talks between the government and opposition which led to
partially free elections in June of that year and the formation of the first non-
Communist government in the Soviet bloc. The character of economic reforms has, to
a large degree, been determined by the political dynamics of the country and – in
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1. An overview of the Polish reform
process, 1989-2001
particular – by the nature and behavior of the collective political actors. These
collective actors, particularly the parties, seemed to have little stability. In the early
years of transformation, actors who had been involved in the anti-communist
opposition movement around the Solidarity trade union dominated the political
process, initiating economic and political reforms. By the time of the elections of 1993,
the Solidarity camp had disintegrated into several factions, while the former
communists, now redefined as social democrats, regrouped as the Alliance of the
Democratic Left (SLD) and – building upon the rise of social dissatisfaction with
reforms effects – succeeded in forming a government. The self-styled right
reconsolidated under the banner of Electoral Movement Solidarity (AWS), to win the
elections of 1997 and to form a government in coalition with the liberal Freedom Union
(UW). The UW, however, gradually became marginalized. In a short time, the AWS
itself lost its credibility as a result of mismanagement of the speeded-up reform process
at the end of the 1990s, combined with corruption scandals. The 2001 election swept
the AWS off the political stage. The SLD returned to government triumphantly, but
scored few successes, of which a positive result of a referendum on the European Union
accession was an important one1. The disintegration or marginalization of the “old”
parties and coalitions – UW, AWS, SLD, the Peasants’ Party (PSL) and the Catholic
nationalist party (ZChN) – was followed by the emergence, at the end of the 1990s and
the beginnings of the next decade, of new political movements and parties. The most
important among them have been the liberal-conservative Citizen’s Platform (PO), the
conservative Law and Justice (PiS), radically nationalist and Catholic League of Polish
Families and radical populist Self-Defense (Samoobrona). All of them scored
considerable successes in the 2001 parliamentary elections. 
The emergence of new parties, however, has had limited relevance to life outside
the small world of the “political class,” as in most cases they have been slightly different
groupings of the same individuals, organized under new banners. The kaleidoscopic
changes on the political scene reflect, however, the deeper problems of the emerging
Polish democracy, which is still far from consolidation (cf. Linz, Stepan, 1996). Poland
has one of the lowest election turnout rates in Europe, while research and opinion polls
show a combination of a lack of interest in politics and a deep mistrust in politicians.
The parties have elusive identities and do not represent social interests well (cf.
Grabowska, Szawiel, 2001). 
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1 Afterwards, due to policy mismanagement and corruption scandals, it was a downward slide, which ended
in the loss of parliamentary support in the spring of 2004 and the resignation of the SLD cabinet. After a
group of dissenters from SLD founded the Social Democratic Party of the Republic of Poland (SDRP), the
number of social democratic parties in the parliament rose to three, including the Labor Union (UP).
Trade unions played an important role up to a point. At the beginnings of the
transformation, the scene was dominated by the Solidarity and by the post-communist
Polish Confederation of Trade Unions (OPZZ). With the progress of privatization and
the rise of unemployment, the role of trade unions diminished, as they are absent in
small firms and hardly visible in foreign-owned firms. Their strongholds are the state-
owned enterprises and public services, where they represent the corporatist interests of
professions in a way similar to other organizations such as Chambers of Medical
Doctors, organizations of lawyers, etc. 
While political actors style themselves as “left” and “right”, their stance on
particular issues does not necessarily reflect what is usually understood by those terms.
The AWS, for instance, which defined itself as “the right,” was more statist and pro-
redistributive than the SLD, which in many respects (e.g., the advocacy by some of its
leaders of a flat income tax rate) was actually closer to the neo-liberals.
At the risk of over-generalization, it is possible to distinguish four political styles.
The first is that of commitment to a particular reform agenda. This is mostly
characteristic for such parties as the UW, which has stressed the needs of market
reforms, but also for the AWS, LPR and PiS, with their zeal to fight former communists
and to defend the “national identity”. To a degree, this is also the case with the UP, a
watered-down Polish version of the New Left, stressing the rights of women and
minorities. The second is that of political marketing, with a focus on political arithmetic
and opinion polls. This was characteristic for the SLD during both periods they were
in power. This style blurs into the third, which is that of clientelism and corruption,
characteristic more for individuals than parties, but to which many of the parties as
organizations – particularly the SLD, PSL, AWS, and Samoobrona – easily fell.  The
fourth is populism, gaining political support through aggressive demagoguery and
cynical electoral promises which are obviously impossible to fulfill. The clearest
example is Samoobrona. 
The quickly changing character of the political scene is reflected in legislation.
Winning coalitions have often stopped reforms started by their predecessors. Parties
and politicians fight to secure support by distributing jobs and making promises to
their electorates. At the same time, consecutive governments have tried to ensure a
modicum of financial stability of the state, if not out of prudence, then because of the
pressure of international financial institutions (IMF, the World Bank, and the Paris
Club), the European Union, and the international financial markets. 
The decade of post-communist transformation brought about a fundamental
institutional change in politics. The 1952 Polish constitution was substantially amended
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in 1989, and then a new constitution was introduced in 1997. Poland became a
parliamentary democracy with a president elected in a popular vote (but with a
relatively restricted role). The functions of government were substantially decentralized
in 1990 and in 1997. Poland’s international orientation shifted radically, with the
country joining NATO in 1999 and the EU in 2004.
1.2. The Reform Process
Poland became the first country in the Communist bloc to undertake
comprehensive reforms designed to dismantle the remnants of command economy
and to introduce market economy instead. In October 1989 the government presented
a program (the so-called Balcerowicz Plan) of fast and deep reforms based on
macroeconomic stabilization and liberalization of the national economy, accompanied
by measures for the building of market economy institutions (this reform package is
described in detail in section 4). Over the course of the next few years, the fiscal
system was reformed with the introduction of personal income tax, corporate income
tax, and value-added tax. Changes in social insurance and public services (pension
reform, health care reform, education reform) were started with a significant delay, a
half decade later than the initial economic reform. In the second half of the 1990s, a
deep rewriting of existing legislation was undertaken as a part of the process of
accession to the EU. 
These reforms gave rise to extensive structural change in the economy. This
included, most importantly, the fast rise of private businesses (mostly small and
medium-sized), the inflow of foreign investment in various forms, the restructuring of
foreign trade, the bulk of which is now with Western Europe (in contrast to the
predominant importance of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union under socialism), the
emergence of a modern banking system (now predominantly in foreign hands), and the
restructuring and privatization of state-owned enterprises (although this process is still
far from completed today). Another aspect of restructuring is the relative decline in the
share of manufacturing in GDP and the increase in the importance of the service sector,
sadly neglected under socialism. 
The achievements of the initial period of transformation were quite remarkable (see
Table 1.1 for an overview). Having experienced the smallest output decline among post-
Communist countries and being the first to return to economic growth (which
impressive rates by the mid-1990s), Poland became a symbol of transition success.
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International financial institutions and many world-known experts often referred to the
Polish experience as a positive example for other post-communist countries.
And yet at the end of the decade Poland’s success proved to be a fragile one. After
the very favorable years 1995-1997, when annual GDP growth ranged from 6% to
almost 7%, the country saw a dramatic slowdown at the end 1990s, bringing GDP
growth down to 1.1% in 2001. At the same time, there was a sharp increase in the
budget deficit, which in 2001 amounted to 5.5% of GDP, as well as growing balance of
payment problems. The unemployment rate, which was already rather high during the
first years of transition, climbed in 2000-2001 and became the highest in Europe
(17.4% as of the end of 2001). Additionally, critical voices have been raised with
increasing frequency concerning the competitiveness of Poland’s industry. These critics
have argued that the opportunity for deep restructuring in the “fat years” of the mid- to
late 1990s was wasted, leaving the country’s economy still dominated by extractive
industries, heavy industry (steel), and national monopolies (telecommunication,
utilities), while the most developed countries (as well as several East Asian countries
and – among the transition countries – Estonia, Slovenia and Hungary) moved forward
toward the “knowledge-based economy.” 
1.3. Reform stagnation
There are two areas of reform stagnation which are of particular importance in our
opinion. One is the reform of the state machinery, the other that of social services.
While the early success of macro- and microeconomic reforms, as well as political
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Notes: The comparability of RCSS estimates of the shares of public sector revenues, expenditures and balance
in GDP for 1991-1993 and 1994-2000 is limited due to changes in the calculation of GDP introduced in 1994.
2001 public sector finance figures are CSO estimates.
Sources: RCSS (2002) except Dąbrowski (1997) for 1990 GDP growth, Piętka, Antczak (2001) for 1990 public
sector finances and CSO web site for 2001 public sector finances.
Table 1.1. Key Polish economic statistics, 1990-2001
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Inflation (CPI; end of year) 249.3 60.4 44.3 37.6 29.5 21.6 18.5 13.2 8.6 9.8 8.5 3.6
Monetization (% GDP) 22.1 26.2 27.5 29.3 29.8 29.6 31.0 33.4 36.0 39.5 40.7 43.5
Registered unemploymen
(end of year)
6.5 12.2 14.3 16.4 16.0 14.9 13.2 10.3 10.4 13.1 15.1 17.4
GDP growth -11.6 -7.0 2.6 3.8 5.2 7.0 6.0 6.8 4.8 4.1 4.0 1.0
Public sector balance
(% GDP)
3.2 -2.3 -5.3 -2.8 -2.8 -2.6 -3.1 -2.9 -2.6 -3.2 -3.0 -5.1
Public sector revenues
(% GDP)
45.4 42.9 44.7 47.1 44.4 43.6 43.0 42.3 41.1 41.2 39.7 38.5
Public sector expenditures
(% GDP)
42.1 45.3 50.0 49.9 47.2 46.1 46.1 45.2 43.6 44.5 42.7 43.6
Balance of payments
(current account; % GDP)
n.a. -3.4 -1.8 -3.3 0.7 4.2 -1.0 -3.0 -4.3 -7.5 -6.3 -4.1
ones, had been spectacular, reforms of public administration, administration of justice,
and various social services were often flawed, substantially delayed, and in some cases
have still not been made. Some of these reforms were passed by the parliament in 1998
and implemented beginning in 1999 (pension reform, health care reform, education
reform, and a reform of sub-national levels of public administration). However, the
design, implementation and results of these reforms are often considered to be mixed
at best, and their impact on public finances has, on the whole, been unambiguously
negative, especially in the case of the education and pension reforms.
We believe that the slowdown described above is indicative of a stagnation – or
even a partial reversal – of the reform process, and the documentation of this reform
stagnation and the examination of its causes are among the central tasks which we will
address in this country report. Examples of setbacks for the reform of the economy
include increased agricultural protectionism and interventionism, state support for
some loss-making enterprises and industries (e.g., the coal industry), the creation of a
sugar cartel, the administrative consolidation of the banking sector. Reform stagnation,
if not setback, could also be observed in the case of the consolidation of the state
monopoly in telecommunication and the failure to significantly reduce the number of
licensing requirements. Among the factors to which various observers ascribe these
tendencies are: weakening of the political will of the governing elites; the consolidation
of the power of special interest groups; the closing of a “window of opportunity” for fast
and radical reforms, and the degradation of the political process as clientelism and
corruption began to dominate it.
Growing interest group pressure and clientelism in economic policy making led to
increased dysfunctions in decision-making at all levels of public administration – a sort
of “spoils system” where assets controlled by the state were used in favor of ruling
coalitions and their allies. At the same time, support for deep reforms has eroded or even
vanished among the majority of the society, and discontent with the current economic
situation and with government is steadily growing, leading to increases in the popularity
of populist politicians (clearly observable in the local elections of autumn 2002).
Moreover, while the gains due to economic restructuring and overall
modernization are hard to deny, there is still much work to be done. On the positive
side we observe an  accessibility of goods and services unparalleled in the past, a rise
in the standard of living of the majority of the population (measured, in particular, by
consumer durables in their possession), the development and accessibility of
information and communication technologies (ICT), and the improvement of such
demographic characteristics as infant mortality and life expectancy. On the other hand,
the technological change occurring in the Polish economy is generally shallow, there is
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little real innovation (as evidenced by the extremely low ratio of R&D spending to GDP,
one of the lowest in the OECD), many small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are
undercapitalized and many are able to produce non-tradable goods only. Poland also
suffers from a severely underdeveloped transportation infrastructure.
Finally, while the economic transformation has undoubtedly brought benefits to
sizable segments of society – especially to a small, but growing middle class – it has also
produced very significant social costs. These include the very high rate of
unemployment mentioned above. This is the single most important factor contributing
to poverty, which – although not very deep – is quite extensive, reaching 15% in 2001.
In the longer run, poverty may contribute to the rise of a permanent underclass of the
excluded. Coupled with relatively high income differences, this may pose a threat to the
reform process, leading to continued growth of the popularity of extremist, populist
parties.
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The lessons learned from the Polish experience provide a wealth of information
concerning both good and bad practices. The Polish experience shows that even a country
which for several years was regarded as the leader in the post-Communist transition can
encounter substantial stumbling blocks, leading to stagnation or even reversal of the
reform process. Even the successful radicalism of the reforms undertaken at the beginning
of transition does not in itself guarantee the sustainability of the rapid pace of the transition
toward a market economy and liberal democratic society. Our main purpose is to identify
both the factors underlying the success of those reforms that were successful and the
factors behind the failures in those areas where success was not achieved. 
For reasons of space, we cannot cover all of the reform initiatives (or areas in
which reforms were not undertaken) of the period studied. We have chosen to deal with
the following areas of reform:
Reform of the state machinery. Here we are interested in the reform of public
administration itself. In particular, we focus on the civil service and the justice system.
This represents, as it were, the “meta-level” of reform: reform of the state itself. 
Macroeconomic stabilization and economic liberalization (including internal and
external trade and price reform). This package of reforms, introduced on 1 January,
1990, was the cornerstone of the transition of Poland’s economy from plan to market
and the key to the country’s emergence from the economic crisis that characterized the
final years of Communist central planning in the country.
Enterprise reform. This includes privatization and restructuring, corporate
governance, the financial restructuring of enterprises and banks, anti-trust policy, and
the like. This represents the micro-level of reforms.
The pension system. This is an important example of a reform that was delayed –
i.e., did not occur in the first wave of reforms at the beginning of the 1990s – but was
nevertheless carried out later with a certain degree of success.
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2. Research questions, methodology,
and hypotheses
Some very important areas of reform which we have omitted include the
development of democratic governance at the subnational (municipal, country and
regional) level, as well as the health service and education. As stated, we have had to
restrict our focus for reasons of space, and an attempt to deal with each of these issues
would involve us in a great deal of fairly technical, sector-specific issues. Moreover, we
believe that the fundamental factors underlying reform failure and success which we
will describe in those areas which we have chosen for our study can to a large extent
be generalized to those areas which we have omitted. 
We will describe the reforms, assess their relative success or failure, and analyze
the causes underlying those successes and failures. 
On the theoretical level, our analysis will be informed primarily by work on three
interrelated major areas of concern:
• The role of the state in market-based economic development;
• The nature of the state’s interaction with society in effecting reform, and
• The role of institution building in the progress and sustainability of reforms.
The following hypotheses will be tested in this study:
Hypothesis 1. One of the key factors in the political economy of reform success is the
degree of match between technocratic or participatory approach compatibility and
the degree to which it is in fact implemented using either a technocratic or
participatory approach. Reforms are successful where there is a good match. 
We propose a classification of reforms on which we base a number of our
hypotheses. We classify reforms by the degree to which they lend themselves to a
technocratic approach as opposed to a more participatory approach involving
negotiation among various social actors – we can refer to this as technocratic approach
compatibility and participatory approach compatibility (e.g., we could hypothesize that
macroeconomic stabilization and liberalization are relatively technical operations,
which can be conducted centrally and in a rather technocratic manner, whereas
enterprise reform and public sector reform are decentralized learning processes which
require much more participation from various stakeholders). 
Here, we build on the framework suggested by Hausner (1995) in his discussion of
what he calls “imperative” and “interactive” approaches to reform in the transition
environment (using the language of our hypotheses these terms could be replaced by
the terms “technocratic” and “participatory,” respectively). Whereas in the past debate
over the relative merits of various such reform approaches has tended to take the form
of advocacy of the superiority of one approach over others, our innovation in this
project would consist in suggesting that there is no universally superior approach and
15
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identifying criteria for evaluating which approach is most appropriate for a given type
of reform. 
Hypothesis 2. The negotiated or participatory approach is successful when the
leading role is assigned to the relevant social actors themselves. The latter are
thereby forced to engage in a learning process of seeking compromises amongst
themselves, with the state’s role limited to that of referee. On the other hand, it is
unsuccessful when the state or its representatives act as distributors of public goods
or rents, leading to rent-seeking behavior by the participants and tendencies of the
state to seek to satisfy all conflicting interests.
A useful approach is that of Stiglitz (1987, 1999), who analyzes the nature of learning
(knowledge transfer) in the economic development process. Echoing Hayek (1945), he
refers to the necessity of using local knowledge about local factors to adapt global
knowledge about “best practices” to local circumstances. Referring to Michael Polanyi’s
well-known distinction between tacit and explicit (codified) knowledge, he then goes on
to discuss how practical know-how is largely tacit knowledge whose transfer requires
learning methods involving personal interaction of the various participants in the
process. Finally, he discusses the process of “learning to learn,” whereby social actors,
through participation in the process of policy design and implementation, learn how to
adapt globally accessible knowledge to their particular circumstances.
Hypothesis 3. One of the key factors leading to the stagnation of reforms in the later
stage of the Polish transformation was the failure of reformers in the early stage to
appreciate the importance of public sector reform and, accordingly, initiate reform
efforts in this area. 
Scholars ranging from Polanyi (1957) to Olson (2000) have demonstrated the
importance of the state’s strength and its capacity to play a “market-augmenting role”
(Olson’s term). Because of the importance of the state’s role in building the market
economy, the reform of the state itself is a necessary condition for sustainable reform
success, as Amsden et al. (1994) argue. Failure to address these questions led to the
capture of the reform process and the state apparatus by clientelism and corruption.
Hypothesis 4. In order for a reform program to be successful, policy making and
institution building must take account of initial conditions and existing cultural and
institutional factors, and stakeholder interests. Concretely, the involvement of local
actors in both the design and implementation of reforms is an important factor in
their success (that is, to use a popular expression, “ownership” of the programs
should be local), and reforms should be “compatible” with the country’s human
capital endowments and cultural habits.
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Hypothesis 5. The “point of no return” beyond which a country can no longer revert
to classic central planning and a totalitarian political regime is reached very early in
the transition process. However, this point is often mistaken for the point at which a
“critical mass” of market reforms is achieved. But, in fact, every transition country
needs to pass another critical point, after which the forces and mechanisms acting
in favor of further reforms become stronger than special interest groups which
establish a privileged position for themselves in the early transition, and the reforms
become self-sustaining.
Major stakeholder interests consolidate around de-etatization and a certain
measure of political pluralism and economic liberalization in the very early days of
transition. The problem is that the re-emerging pluralism and partial liberalization of
the early transition period gives rise to special interest groups (“early winners”) which
gain rents from limited access to public goods and economic privileges (licenses,
monopoly positions, etc.), while lack of effective accountability in the public sector
leads to its capture by these interest groups. Slow and inconsistent reforms enhance the
influence of such groups, and at the same time, enterprise behavior is adjusted to
reflect the distortions of an environment which is only partially reformed. This
produces a threat of slow-reform, low-level equilibrium trap. Therefore, the success of
reforms depends on the degree to which both the interests of potential allies of the
reformers and the need to overcome the existing (often informal) structures of group
interests formed under Socialism (which may retain their influence and hinder the
reform process) are taken into account. 
Olson’s (1971, 1984) analysis of the mechanisms whereby special interests capture
the political process is very well known and will be particularly useful here. Greskovits
(1998) compares the experience of the Central European transition counties with those
of many Latin American countries, noting that economic reforms involving austerity
programs often break down in Latin America due to public unrest and asking why this
has not been the case in Central Europe. He argues that the Central European reforms
have been more successful and sustainable than in many Latin American countries
because of the presence in the Central European countries of various structural,
institutional, and cultural factors, often absent in Latin America, that have acted as
brakes on the types of special interest group collective actions analyzed by Olson which
can undermine reform. On the one hand, for example, policy makers who promise
populist reversals of reforms during in election campaigns find their options effectively
limited due to such institutional constraints (such as those imposed by international
institutions) after taking office. On the other, the social potential for unrest is limited
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due to the relative lack of trade union militancy and the relatively small proportion of
the population which is genuinely impoverished and marginalized. 
Our analysis of the role of interest groups also relies on the work of Hellman (1998)
and Mitra and Selowsky (2002).
Hellman (1998) described the low-level reform equilibrium trap and claimed that
even though the reforms deliver the largest gains when they are comprehensive, if in
the early phases of reform there are concentrated gains among a subset of actors that
arise from partially reformed economy, and if political and legal institutions do not
constrain the winners, they will seek to consolidate their advantageous positions –
which allow them to extract monopoly rents – in the evolving institutional framework,
and block further reforms.
In addition to these early winners, two more groups of actors, whose strength and
behavior affects the course and dynamics of transformation, exist.
The first group are “reform advocates” – actors interested in consistent market
reforms, because they benefit from reform progress. Apart from pro-reform politicians,
these are actors connected to the largest part of the emerging private sector (that part
of it which is not captured by the early winners), both privatized and green-field. After
Karla Hoff, they can be called “entrepreneurs,” as opposed to the “tunnelers” of the first
group (Hoff, 2000).
The second one is also a large group that can be described as “transformation
losers” all progress in market reforms is a threat for them as an interest group.
Nevertheless, with intensification of reforms, their losses do not increase with initial
dynamics (because of improvement of overall economic conditions and some
adaptation processes within this group of actors).
It should be noted that while these three interest groups exist during the whole
period of transformation, both their composition and their influence on the reform
process changes in the course of reform implementation. There are flows from one
group from another. In the course of the Polish reforms, we have observed outflow from
the group of reform losers in the state sector to the group of reform advocates in the
case of privatization, and to the group of “tunnelers” in the case of suspended
privatizations and creation of sectoral monopolistic structures (in coal mining, sugar
industry, metallurgy, etc.). The “reform advocates” group may grow not only due to the
privatization of the enterprises for which they work, but also due to inflows from the
group of early winners, when some of its representatives are no longer satisfied with
the gains they enjoy at the early equilibrium point and become aware of the possibility
of gains to be had from, e.g., an efficient public administration and justice system,
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transparent corporate governance, a stable currency, etc. By contrast, when reforms
stagnate, some actors from the reforms advocates group may adapt to such an
intermediate state of economy and its institutional framework created by the low
reform equilibrium trap, coming to view any changes in the status quo (even reform
acceleration) as too risky to the gains they have realized to date. 
Based on the findings of Mitra and Selowsky (2002)2, we can draw three curves
which correspond the gains of these three interest groups (see Figure 2.1). For the
reform advocates, reforms would impose some temporary sacrifices, with the promise
of increasing gains as reforms intensify. Early winners prefer a partial reform scenario,
supporting reforms up to level R2. Whereas reform losers prefer the status quo (R0) and
oppose all reforms. 
Assuming that gains of interest groups determine their impact on reform process
through the voting mechanisms, lobbying, etc., Figure 2.1 shows that in the course of
transition, configurations of interest groups pass through three critical points. The R1
point is a “point of no return,” after which the combined force of “reform advocates” and
early winners is stronger than that of reform losers. This point is often mistakenly taken
for the “critical mass” point of market reforms, but in fact it only denotes that return to
centrally planned economy is no longer possible, but does not guarantee the success of
market reforms. The most dangerous is the R2 point which represents the highest gains
of the “early winners” who have a still strong tactical ally in the form of reform losers –
this point represents the above-mentioned equilibrium trap. As was stated above, the
equilibrium is additionally enforced by adaptation of some of the “reform advocates” to
the existing rules of the game and lack of credibility of the government. Some other
factors also contribute to petrifaction of such an equilibrium, among others the reform
fatigue syndrome (Lora et al. 2003) – loss of public confidence in the pro-market reforms
and/or less pro-active stance towards them – especially if a country does not experience
deep economic crisis and both leaders and society become less willing to take risks.
At R3, pro-reform groups become stronger than “early winners” and
“transformation losers” together and are able to either compensate the losses of the
other groups or to generate enough political pressure to neutralize opposition to
continued reform. In other words, at this point the free play of actors and interest
groups no longer poses a threat to the system, there is no need in special policy to
prompt development and to suppress “anti-reform” forces. 
Figure 1 shows the crucial importance not only of fighting against “early winner”
groups, but also of eliminating the “transformation losers” group, which can be done
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mainly by fast and consistent reforms aimed at elimination of the state sector of the
economy. Figure 2.1 is a good illustration of the thesis that slow and inconsistent
reforms may jeopardize the ultimate goal of the post-Communist transition: building a
selfsustaining market economy and democratic society.
Hypothesis 6. External factors are important in shaping the reform process. 
This hypothesis relates to three concrete aspects of the Polish reform experience:
a) The prospects of NATO and EU membership have represented both an opportunity
(accession as a reward for reform) and a threat (non-accession as punishment for
failure to reform). Accordingly, the strength of the incentives associated with this
external factor depends on the credibility of the threat of non-accession. We
hypothesize that the credibility of this threat diminished over time in the case of
Poland and this was one of the factors leading to reform stagnation. 
b) We will also test the hypothesis that international institutions such as the World
Bank, IMF, Paris Club and London Club have played a critical role in constraining
the actions of policy makers as well as in shaping their thinking about both the
content of reform and the manner of their implementation. 
c) Our third hypothesis concerning the external environment is that the international
business cycle and external shocks such as the collapse of the CMEA in the early
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(1) – groups interested in consistent reforms; (2) – "early winners"; (3) – "transformation losers"
R0 – starting point of the transition;
R1 – "point of no return";
R2 – the most favorable point for the "early winners"; 
R3 – "critical mass" point. 
a For example, measured by the EBRD transformation indicators.
Figure 2.1. Interest groups gains in the course of transformation
R1 Reform progressa R3
R2
(1)
(2)
(3)
R0
Group gains
1990s acted to hinder consolidation of reforms (e.g., by extending the
“transformational recession” and thereby reducing the popularity of reform-oriented
political parties).
To test these hypotheses, in addition to use of the existing literature on the Polish
reforms, we have conducted interviews with consultants and experts personally
involved in, or closely observing, the Polish reform process. 
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In this section, we focus on the reforms of two segments of the state machinery: the
civil service and the administration of justice. In both cases, we deal with reforms that
were incomplete and/or flawed. This resulted in shortfalls in the state capacity for
designing and implementing other reforms, as well as for disciplining the social actors
into conforming with the rules of the game. Architects of the Polish reforms – such as
Jerzy Hausner, who co-authored the Polish pension reform – perceive the ineffectiveness
of state machinery as an important stumbling block. While it is capable of routine work,
it is largely ineffective at designing and implementing strategic changes (Hausner, 2004).
3.1 Civil service
The creation of a competent, honest and apolitical civil service was supposed to
alleviate low professional and ethical standards of Polish public administration (World
Bank, 1999; Grosse, 2001). However, the laws introducing the civil service were passed
relatively late and have been changed to suit successive governments. The first regulation
was passed in 1996, to be quickly changed in 1998 (after the formation of the new
government in the autumn of 1997). There are deep doubts as to the degree to which
these regulations have really been implemented in practice (Brunetko, 2003). At the same
time, there seems to be little public appreciation of the importance of these reforms, as
only slightly over 20% of adult Poles have ever heard of the civil service, and only 5% have
a rudimentary knowledge about its character and functions (Brunetko, 2003, 3).  
Legacy and Challenges
Before 1989, there was no civil service in a legal sense. Public administration
worked under the general principles of the party nomenklatura system, according to
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3. Reforms of the state machinery
which all appointments in the administration were made on the recommendations of
the Communist party. Thus, the period of state socialism left a particular legacy: people
employed, trained and socialized in a system which the political and economic
transformation was supposed to change continued to staff public administration after
1989. Moreover, there was little in the way of traditions dating from the period before
state socialism. Poland has no tradition of centralized absolutism, which lay at the roots
of early modern bureaucracies in France, Prussia and Sweden – quite the contrary, it
developed probably the extreme case of a government system based upon clientelism
(Mączak, 1994). In the crucial period for the formation of modern European nation
states, Poland was partitioned between Russia, Prussia, and Austria. Although the latter
two developed very sophisticated public administration systems, this did not influence
the Polish tradition much, as these states were perceived as usurpers and Polish
nationalist ideology considered acting against the state as patriotic. While modern
public administration had developed during the inter-war years, it was a short period,
and during the war, under the German and Soviet occupation, acting against the state
once again became the only socially accepted behavior (Górski, 2001-2002). 
Similar attitudes – although not in such dramatic force as during the World War II
– were widespread among the democratic opposition during the last two decades of
state socialism. While renouncing force or violence, opposition activists questioned the
legitimacy of the existing state and, in their political practice, successfully relied upon
spontaneous civic activity fuelled by idealistic motivations, and not upon the formal,
legal-rational hierarchical structures. Thus, of the two forces that were to shape the
Polish institutions after 1989 – the ex-communists and the ex-oppositionists – one had
a tradition of state abuse and the other of state negation.
In contrast to very vivid debates of the early 1990s on the issues how markets
should be institutionally designed, there was very little debate on redesign of the state
machinery. In particular, no attention had been paid to the civil service. Moreover,
when this debate started, no earlier than five years after the collapse of state socialism,
it was mostly among specialists professionally involved with administrative change.
During this debate, foreign experience was studied and merits of various systems were
analyzed (Office of the Council of Ministers, 1995; Rydlewski, 2001; Grosse, 2001). The
issue of a desirability of civil service re-emerged in the daily and weekly press only at
the end of the decade, mostly in relation to a growing awareness of corruption, but
rarely went beyond either complaints or demands for change.
At the beginning of the transformation, the attention of the new political elite was
focused not on the desirable institutional design, but rather on the practical and
political question of the suitability of the officials of the former regime in the new
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situation. It was evident, however, that it was impossible to introduce radical changes,
as the problem concerned tens of thousands of persons for whom there were no ready
replacements available (see Table 3.1). 
The quality of the public sector also suffered because of noncompetitive salaries3.
Table 3.1 shows that there was a tendency to develop public administration in size
rather than in quality. There was little (if any) systematic effort to introduce pay
structures that would lead to the establishment of a lean administration – not large in
size, but well paid, highly competent and honest. 
On top of that, there was little support from the international financial institutions
playing an active part in the Polish transformation. In the early formulations of
Washington Consensus type approach to transformation, the question of state capacity
and strength tended to be neglected. Those arguing the need to strengthen the civil
service were in the minority (cf. Nunberg, Nellis, 1990; Nunberg, Barbone, 1992). The
prevailing tone of advice was to stress “government failure” and the need to reduce the
state both for fiscal reasons and for all kinds of political economy reasons (rent-seeking
etc.). This attitude was often amplified in the rhetoric of post-communist politics,
because of the historically understandable allergy towards the state and lack of belief
in the possibility of reforming the existing state machinery. There initially was little
appreciation of the fact that Poland, like many less developed countries, had a weak
state with a deficient bureaucracy, which required repair (Kochanowicz, 1994).  Only
since the mid-1990s was a revival of attention to the question of “state capacity” and
the role of the state as an institution builder observed (World Bank, 1997, 2002).
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Sources: Central Statistical Office (1992, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2002).
Table 3.1. The size of the central public administration (including regional and county
authorities, in thousands)
Year Employed
1990  75.2
1991  93.3
1992 104.7
1993 115.4
1994 133.4
1995 137.5
1996 151.0
1997 157.5
1998 166.0
1999 142.9
2000 135.0
In fact, as Table 3.1 shows, the size of the public administration has not decreased;
quite the contrary. Moreover, the figures given in this table may be doubled if local and
regional administration (which does not fall under the regulation of the civil service)
are added. Employment in public administration increased after the lowest level of
territorial administration, the gmina (township or municipality) was democratized and
empowered in 1990, and then once again after the reform of 1998, which introduced
the powiat or county level. 
Table 3.2 provides an indication of how high the economic costs of the low quality
of Poland’s public administration were approximately five years ago. The table shows
results of an EBRD survey in which business managers told what percentage of their
time they spent in dealing with public officials. Poland was even worse than Russia, not
to mention its Central European neighbors.
New Regulations
The Solidarity government made a move towards the improvement of public
administration through a creation, in 1991, of the National School of Public
Administration (KSAP) – a postgraduate, professional two-year school, loosely modeled
on the French Ecole Nationale d’Administration, “[b]y far the most energetic, ambitious
effort in public administration training” (Nunberg, Barbone, 1994, 267). However, as
the number of graduates has been small, it has played a limited role in the restructuring
of public service. Moreover, they also often seem not to fit the established work culture
and, when entering various agencies, are treated with a lack of sympathy by the older
colleagues (Brunetko, 2003). The necessity to introduce more comprehensive changes
was acknowledged by subsequent administrations, but the first law was not passed
until 1996, under the rule of the SLD-PSL coalition. 
This legislation declared the apolitical character of the civil service and a dividing
line was drawn between political and professional appointments. The PM, the ministers
and their deputies, and voivods (regional governors) and their deputies were declared
political appointees, resigning with the change of administration. Handpicked
members of their political cabinets and their advisors were treated in a similar way. As
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Source: EBRD, 2002.
Table 3.2. Time spent by managers on contacts with public officials (% of total working time)
Country Time (%)
Poland 9.5%
Russia 9.0%
Slovakia 7.0%
Hungary 7.0%
Czech Republic 2.5%
for the civil service itself, the reform introduced the concept of the civil servant
(urzędnik służby cywilnej), to be nominated according to a strict procedure. The 1996
regulations also introduced a distinction between heading a given sector of public
administration (a function performed by a minister or equivalent official at the central
level, and by the voivod at the regional level) and managing the ministry or voivodship
office. The latter function was to be performed by directors general, apolitical members
of the civil service.
This reform was short-lived, as the new AWS-UW administration that took office in
1997 introduced a new, differently designed law in 1998 (effective in 1999). The new
regulations followed the line of the 1997 constitution, which required the creation of a
professional, apolitical civil service corps, and which banned elected officials from
holding posts in the public administration (except the posts of ministers and state
secretaries).
The general public has not shown any particular interest in the creation of the civil
service. This problem also seemed to attract much less attention of experts than other
public sector reforms – such as local and regional administration reform, pension
system reform, or reform of health care – that were introduced by the AWS
government. Thus, the most important actors seemed to be political parties. While they
paid lip service to the needs of introducing an apolitical service, their attitude in
practice was negative. Poland quickly learned the spoils system and developed an
informal pattern of “the winner takes all,” i.e. vast changes in the administrative
personnel following changes in government. The post-Solidarity forces usually justified
this by the desire to bring in people untainted by a communist past, while the Social
Democrats stressed the professionalism and experience of their nominees. Each side
tried to influence the final outcome first by designing the actual shape of reform in a
way convenient for them, and second by circumventing the rules in the appointment
process if that suited the needs of the day. Clientelism and patronage have developed
on both sides. For these reasons, in terms of the framework proposed in section 2 in the
discussion of hypothesis 5, we identify the political parties constituted at the outset of
the transition as the group of “early winners” who have blocked the implementation of
reforms which would reduce the scope of the all-encompassing spoils system to create
a true civil service in Poland.
The 1998 regulations defined the civil corps as all those working in the public
administration and divided them into two groups: employees (zatrudnieni) and
functionaries (urzędnicy). The Head of the Civil Service is appointed for a term of five
years by the Prime Minister, and backed by the Bureau of the Civil Service (Urząd
Służby Cywilnej). The Civil Service Council, appointed by the Prime Minister, makes
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recommendations and expresses opinions on the organization of examinations and
competitions. The new law became operational in mid-1999. The new definition of the
civil service resulted in the increase of its membership from 104 at the beginning of
1999 to 116,000 at the end of the year (Rydlewski, 2001, 36). As in the regulations of
1996, members of the civil corps are restricted in their political activity, business
dealings and outside employment. The entrance to the corps is through a labor
contract, for a probationary period of six months. Information about the available
positions has to be made public. After a review procedure, the temporary contract can
be changed to a regular labor contract. 
The change of status to a functionary is made on the basis of examinations, organized
once a year. The number of appointments is limited by budgetary considerations. KSAP
graduates are exempted from the examinations. Functionaries are not employed in the
sense of Labor Code, but appointed. Their position entails more privileges (pay scale, job
security), but the restrictions affecting them are also more severe. The target figure for
the share of functionaries in the civil corps is 15% (Rydlewski, 2001, 44). The regulations
also introduced the concept of a “higher functionary” (from ministry departmental
director up). Appointment to these positions requires organization of a competition, open
to all functionaries. The institution of political cabinets (whose members are not recruited
from among the civil service) has been retained from the 1996 regulations.
The extent of the civil service is confined to those sectors of the public
administration which are answerable to the ministers and to the Prime Minister. They
comprise the central institutions as well as offices of the national administration at the
voivodship and powiat levels. The administrative staffs of elected governments at the
gmina, powiat and voivodship levels are excluded, as are the offices of the President,
the Sejm and the Senate. The customs service operates under different regulations, and
the foreign service is regulated by a separate law. 
The Outcomes
Without doubt, the introduction of the civil service has been a step in the right
direction, insofar as it defined the role of public administrators and erected barriers
between them and the worlds of business and politics. The regulations are criticized for
concentrating all the issues of the civil service in one single office, for introducing a
single corps and thereby failing to differentiate various specific areas of public service
(with the aforementioned exceptions of the customs and foreign service), for imprecise
regulations concerning the higher functionaries, etc. (Rydlewski, 2001, 56). There is
also a lack of similar regulations for local administration.
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Implementation, moreover, has proceeded slowly. In 1999, many individuals
employed in the public administration were simply reclassified as members of the civil
corps with a stroke of the pen; however, this did not change much in substance. The
interest in promotion to the status of functionaries was has been low. In 2000, less than
600 people applied, and only about 200 of them got appointments (Rydlewski, 2001, 44)4.
This obviously restricted the recruitment base for the higher functionaries and opened up
the possibility that persons who went through the competition procedure would be
employed on a temporary basis, which the regulations allow in specified circumstances.
The results of the first qualifying examinations for the status of functionary shed
light on the overall quality of the personnel employed in the public administration
(Rydlewski 2001). Only 5% of applicants had certificates of foreign language knowledge
(which was required of the functionaries), and only 5% declared a willingness to
acquire such a certificate. The examinations conducted in 2000 showed poor
orientation in general matters and very low writing skills (Rydlewski, 2001, 44). Taking
into consideration the fact that those who applied are probably the most ambitious
among the civil service personnel, these results give little ground for optimism.
Reasons for the late introduction and slow and half-hearted implementation of the
civil service reform can be summarized in three related points. 
• Politicization. The practice of the reform implementation shows the lack of real
commitment of political parties to introducing the civil service, as it deprives
them of the possibility of job distribution and makes the administrative staff more
independent and less servile (Grosse, 2001). The aforementioned personnel moves
in 1997 may easily be interpreted as showing that both the losing and the winning
coalitions were interested in having as much influence on the appointments to the
civil service as possible. The same pattern seems to have been continued when the
SLD regained power in 2001, as flagrant cases of violation of the civil service
regulations show (Brunetko, 2003). 
• Path dependency. Because of its history, Poland has little tradition and
appreciation of the importance and functions of the state. As political philosopher
Bronisław Łagowski (2004) puts it bluntly, “Poles are unable to build a state.”
Having little experience with creation of impersonal, legal-rational organizations,
Poland instead has a long tradition of a political culture based on clientelism and
personalized relations (Mączak, 1994; Kochanowicz, 1994, 2004; Tarkowski,
1994). Thus, clientelistic attitudes shape everyday behavior of the present-day
functionaries (Hausner, 2004). Poland also shares with many less advanced
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societies a tendency of the middle classes to rely on employment by the state, often
obtained through patronage. This is the case with Latin America, where – as Naím
(1994) observes – “discharging formal functions that justify an agency’s existence
weighs much less in determining its daily operations than does the need to serve
as a welfare agency for its employees and their families.” This was also the case
throughout the last two centuries of the history of all Central Eastern Europe
(Janos, 2000). 
• Passive resistance of the employees. Many of the employees, realizing their limited
skills and limited possibilities of improvement, are hardly interested in
introduction of the merit-based system which hinders their chances for survival
and promotion.
Assessing the process of implementation of civil service reform, it is necessary to
take into consideration historical experience of other countries, which shows that this
process is long and protracted (Grosse, 2001). It demands an appreciation of the
importance of efficient administration by political leaders, designing and building
proper legal institutions and – last but not least – changes of the political culture and
work culture by the functionaries and the employees of the public sector. 
3.2. Administration of Justice
At the beginning of the present decade the justice system was in crisis5. “The Polish
justice system suffers from a grave illness, and its treatment demands radical steps and
the determination of decision makers” – with these words Marek Safjan, the current
president of the Constitutional Tribunal, summed up the situation in 2002 (Zieliński,
Zubik, 2002, 113).  Symptoms of crisis included low rates of solving crimes, the backlog
of cases in the courts, low rate of convictions, a high percentage of suspended sentences
(which in practice often means no sentence at all), a low level of crime reporting, and
overcrowding of prisons, including waiting periods for serving prison terms
(Siemaszko, 1999, 2002, 2002a, 2003). In civil matters, the symptoms were long
waiting periods for court hearings, high costs of legal help and protracted procedures
in non-litigious cases. 
There were two important outcomes of this critical situation. One was that the
inefficiency of the justice system hampered economic life because of queues, delays,
poor protection of property rights, and financial losses of persons and businesses
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falsely accused of tax evasions or white collar crimes, who have to wait long before
their name is cleared (Instytut Wymiaru Sprawiedliwości, 1998). Another was that it
has eroded the legitimacy of the state and trust in public institutions in general, or – to
put it differently – that it negatively affected the process of building institutions of the
democratic state and the rule of law, which were among the most important goals for
the post-communist societies.
In what follows, we focus on a single, pivotal segment of the justice system, namely
the courts, and one aspect of that system’s operations, namely efficiency. We will not
deal here with other important elements, such as the Prosecution Service, the police
force and the prison service, as well as such many important aspects of the judiciary
itself such as the penal tendencies or corruption.
Early Reforms
The Polish legal system is a variant of the continental European model, historically
influenced by both the German and the French traditions. Although heavily affected by
the period of state socialism, it nevertheless retained a certain continuity. The standards
of teaching of the legal profession – at the leading universities, at least – were relatively
high, as there was a continuity of professorship and legal schools through the
communist period. Laws were changed and amended to suit the demands of the
communist political system and command economy, but not changed wholesale.
Judges were recruited and promoted according to the nomenklatura system principles,
but – except during the times of Stalinism and cases of particular political importance
– they retained a degree of independence. In the late phase of communism, even certain
spheres earlier reserved for a discretionary decision of the state were put under a
degree of court control through the introduction of administrative courts, labor courts
and the office of the ombudsman. 
The changes introduced after the fall of state socialism did not have an abrupt and
wholesale character – as was the case for example with macroeconomic policies – but
have had rather a piecemeal, incremental and continuous character. The basic
principles of the new position of the judiciary were already negotiated during the
Round Table talks of 1989. The ideas about the position of courts crystallized during the
constitutional debate of the early 1990s, which stressed the idea of separation of
powers, the independence of judges, and the right to appeal (Kubuj, 1999). Milestones
in the reform process were amendments to the Constitution in April 1989, which
stressed the separation of powers and secured the position of the judges, a law of July
1989 which introduced the Courts of Appeal, the Constitutional Act (so-called Little
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Constitution) of 1992 which amended the Constitution of 1952 and the new
Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 1997. Also noteworthy are the new Company
Code adopted in 2001 and the new criminal code of 1997. 
As a result of reforms, the system of justice is composed of tribunals and courts
(Kubuj, 1999; Jankowski, Siemaszko, 1999). The Constitutional Tribunal (set up in
1985) decides in cases related to the constitutionality of national legislation and its
compliance with international agreements. The State Tribunal (set up in 1982) decides
in cases when holders of the highest positions in the state are charged with violating
the Constitution or other legislative acts. The court system, as a result of reforms
undertaken after 1990, is composed of the Supreme Court, the Chief Administrative
Court (with 10 local branches), the military courts and the common courts. The
common courts are divided into 10 courts of appeal, 41 regional courts and 296 district
courts. Until the 1997 Constitution, misdemeanor boards also existed; the new
constitution shifted their responsibilities to the district courts. The common courts have
specialized divisions (often called courts as well): Family and Juvenile; Labor and
Social Security; Commercial; Sanction and Enforcement, and Registration. 
Together, the courts employ close to 8,000 judges. The judges enjoy very far-
reaching independence and autonomy: they are appointed by the President upon the
nomination of the National Judiciary Council, a self-governing body of the judicial
profession. They cannot be removed from office and have judicial immunity (their
disciplinary accountability is before their professional bodies). On the other hand, they
are barred from political activity and outside employment. Their salaries are a multiple
of the average salary in the public sector and depend solely upon position and seniority.
After retirement they are granted pensions equal to 75% of last pay. Their daily work is
supervised solely by the Court President (responsible for distributing cases and
organizing court work). The Court President is elected by other judges.  
The reforms of the early 1990s stemmed from the general ideas guiding the
democratic transformation – the ideas of rule of law, of the separation of powers and
of human rights. Rule of law was supposed to be the basic principle of public life, which
led to the conclusion that citizens should be given easy access to courts. There was a
widespread belief that the independence of courts and judges should be protected as
much as possible, especially given the negative experience under the previous regime.
In regard to criminal procedure, there were beliefs that protection of the rights of
defendants needed to be strengthened, particularly through elaborate trial rules. These
beliefs undoubtedly stemmed from the public memory of bending the legal rules in
political trials under communism. Thus, in terms of the framework proposed in section
2 in the discussion of hypothesis 5, judges constitute the group of “early winners” of this
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reform area – a group, which, in accordance with that framework, effectively blocks
further reform.
Dysfunctionalities of the System
The ideas guiding these reforms were high-minded, but they tended to produce
various unintended consequences. Zieliński and Zubik (2002) state that procedures in
the Polish courts are overcomplicated and protracted, access to courts restricted
because of high costs of legal advice, the efficiency of execution of court decisions low,
and court rulings often incomprehensible for the public. They cite opinions of experts
according to which courts are inefficient, in a state close to collapse and devoid of any
prestige. The most visible symptom of the court system’s low efficiency is the rising
backlog of cases, which in 1996 amounted to 1.6 million and by the end of 1998
reached 1.9 million (see Table 4). At that time, it took on the average 18 months to two
years to have a case decided (Kubuj, 1999, 258; Zubik, 2001, 35). The protracted
character of court proceedings is stressed by several analyses of the Institute of the
Administration of Justice. It assesses this as the most serious problem of the Polish
system of justice, although a slight improvement was observed in the year 2000
(Instytut Wymiaru Sprawiedliwości, 1998, 2000; Siemaszko, 1998; Siemaszko n.d.). As
a result of de facto difficult access to courts, Poland lost several cases at the Strasbourg
Tribunal6. Out of 42 rulings of the Tribunal in cases against Poland, 24 supported the
claims of the plaintiffs (Polityka, February 22, 2003). The inefficiency of the courts has
led to a dramatic decrease of the prestige of the judicial power, and generally low trust
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Source: Instytut Wymiaru Sprawiedliwości (2001, 33).
Table 3.3. Cases in the Polish Common Courts (in millions)
Year Old                New  Closed
1989 0.3   2.0 1.9
1990 0.4   2.4 2.3
1991 0.4   2.7 2.7
1992 0.7   4.2 3.9
1993 0.9   4.6 4.3
1994 1.2   4.9 4.5
1995 1.6   4.9 4.8
1996 1.6   4.9 5.0
1997 1.5   5.0 5.1
1998 1.5   6.4 6.1
1999 1.9   6.6 6.7
2000 1.8   7.4 7.4
in the justice system in turn has led to reduced rates of reporting crimes (Zubik, 2001,
55ff; Siemaszko, 1999, 2001). The economic effects of the low efficiency of the court
system can be surmised on the basis of the EBRD statistics on remittance recovery
time, as shown in Table 5. According to these data, 31 days are needed to recover
remittances in Poland (as opposed to 16 days in Hungary, 12 days in the Czech
Republic and Slovakia, 8 days in Russia and 7 days in Latvia).
The main reasons for the low efficiency of the court system are as follows.
• Too wide jurisdiction of the courts.  This leads to the overloading of judges and
courts beyond their capacity (Siemaszko, in Zieliński, Zubik, 2002; Siemaszko,
2003; Osiatyński, 2003a). Part of the reason is constitutional, i.e. the idea of giving
citizens easy access to courts. This is, however, also partly an unintended
consequence of various legislation. Of particular importance for the jamming of
the system are non-litigious matters (registration of businesses etc. – over 2.5
million cases in 2000 [Instytut Wymiaru Sprawiedliwości 2001, 34]), the petty
cases shifted to courts after the misdemeanor boards were abolished, and the cases
of disability pensions. The latter problem stems from the social insurance law.
Under this law, special medical committees grant disability pensions. The changes
in regulation abolished the right to appeal decisions of these committees within the
social insurance administration. This prompts the dissatisfied clients to seek court
appeal immediately. The number of such cases in the common courts increased six-
fold between 1989 and 2000 (Instytut Wymiaru Sprawiedliwości, 2001, 40). 
• Deficient legal career paths, affecting judges’ work. In general, there is a tendency
for the legal professions in Poland to acquire a closed, guild-like character. This is
particularly the case of attorneys, the most lucrative legal profession, and one to
which entry tends to be barred for people who are not from attorneys’ families.
Judges’ careers are much less attractive, and are for young law graduates from
families with no family connections to the profession (Osiatyński, 2003a;
Siemaszko, 2003). Thus, becoming a judge is not the crowning of a legal career,
but usually a first job, begun after a short internship process (aplikacja) which
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Source: EBRD 2002.
Table 3.4. Remittance recovery time (in days)
Country Days
Poland 31
Czech Republic 12
Hungary 16
Slovakia 12
Latvia   7
Russia   8
often immediately follows the completion of university studies. As a result, the
experience of many judges is limited both in relation to the substance of the
matters they have to decide upon as well as in relation to the preparation and
organization of trials (Zubik, 2001, 31; Zieliński, Zubik, 2002, 38-9). The relatively
low salaries, moreover, lead the best persons to leave the profession for much
better-paid jobs in the private sector (Kubuj, 1999, 261).
• The excessive independence and self-regulatory powers of judges, both as
individuals and as a professional group. The idea of judicial independence had
been transferred from the Anglo-Saxon tradition of common law, where
becoming a judge crowns a legal career and where there is an established
tradition of responsibility. Thus, the status of the judge as a functionary of the state
(the continental model) had been radically altered. Moreover, this transfer has not
been accompanied by the establishment of institutions safeguarding responsibility
(Osiatyński, 2003a). The “early winner” group constituted by the country’s
judiciary organized itself and lobbies the political system to its advantage
(Siemaszko, 2003; Osiatyński, 2003a). Judges cannot be removed from office,
their pay does not depend upon their work efficiency but only upon seniority, and
the court president (elected by his/her colleagues) has very little real power over
them. They have legal immunity, and in misdemeanor cases their cases have first
to be heard by a disciplinary board of their peers. While this undoubtedly protects
legal impartiality, it also prevents the monitoring of efficiency and sometimes
makes difficult the punishment of obvious abuses, including corruption,
particularly because the National Judiciary Council tends to serve de facto as a
judges’ trade union, protecting their interests and safeguarding them against
public criticism (Osiatyński, 2003a). They also have too many administrative
powers regarding the organization of their work, which is not the same thing as
independence in sentencing. This excessive independence makes them work
much less efficiently than is the case with the members of the prosecution service,
who have to answer to their superiors (Siemaszko, 2003).
• Overly complicated and ineffective procedures and poorly organized court work.
These problems are particularly harmful in petty cases. In part, they stem from the
amendments in the Code of Criminal Procedure, giving the accused and their
defenders various possibilities for prolongation and extension of trials (Zubik, 2001,
39). In part, the problems also result from the lack of experience of judges and from
“a tradition of transforming almost any case into a large and long trial, during
which counselors for each party may argue against each other in the style known
from American trial movies” (Zieliński, Zubik, 2002, 25). Polish judges often allow
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for redundant evidence and testimony, which lengthens trials (Osiatyński, 2003a).
Trials are rarely run in the afternoons, and rarely on consecutive days; usually they
are broken up by long adjournments (Osiatyński, 2003a, 2003b). The high share of
female judges, as well as the feminization of clerical work, additionally hampers
willingness to work in the afternoons, as in Poland women still carry the main
burden of household responsibilities (Siemaszko, 2003). Procedures disciplining
defendants and hostile witnesses to appear in court are ineffective, which often
causes additional delays. Court proceedings are not recorded by professional sworn
court reporters; instead, oral depositions are repeated by the judges for the record.
This effectively doubles the times of the proceedings (Instytut Wymiaru
Sprawiedliwości, 1998; Osiatyński, 2003b, 196-8).
• Poor infrastructure and low quality of court staff. Many buildings are old and
dilapidated, with trial rooms inadequate in size and number. There is a lack of
offices for the judges, and office space for the clerical workers is also inadequate.
(At the same time, the scarce trial space is not used in the afternoons.) Space and
storage conditions for court records are insufficient. There is a lack of cells in the
court buildings for the accused under arrest. Legal libraries, where they exist at all,
are inadequate. Computers and access to legal databases are lacking. According to
Zubik (2001, 28-9) only 2% of judges had a PC at their disposal. Judges are
overburdened with administrative and clerical work (Zubik, 2001; Zieliński, Zubik,
2002, 42).  The clerical staff is inadequate in numbers and skills and is extremely
badly paid, which breeds corruption (Zubik, 2001, 31; Osiatyński, 2003a).
There is no lack of ideas for the improvements of the situation in the courts. Quite the
contrary, experts (particularly those preparing various reports for the government Institute
of the Administration of Justice and the independent Institute for Public Affairs) put
together long lists of recommendations for improving the efficiency of the administration
of justice. Interestingly, despite the overburdening of the system by the excessive number
of cases and by backlogs, there are no proposals for increasing the number of judges.
Instead, most of the proposals boil down to making their work more efficient. 
Recommendations suggest reducing the workload of courts related to petty cases
and non-litigious cases. The first issue is already dealt with through the introduction of
special divisions of district courts (sądy grodzkie, borough courts) which will rely on a
simplified procedures in misdemeanor and petty crime cases. For the second, there is
a suggestion of either shifting the non-litigious cases to other, specialized institutions or
delegating them to court officials working under judges’ supervision (Zieliński, Zubik,
2002, 132). There are recommendations to make entry into the judicial profession
competitive, as in Spain (Siemaszko, 2003). Suggestions have been made to make
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judges work more efficiently by introducing more oversight by the court presidents and
through incentives in the pay system, through the introduction of court managers
(Siemaszko in Zieliński, Zubik, 2002, 125), through the introduction of a two-shift work
system of courts, and through the development of clerical staff. Finally, the necessity of
improving the technical infrastructure (particularly, computerization) is emphasized. 
Interpretation of the Reform Failure
If ills are diagnosed and experts know how to treat them, why is so little done to
improve the situation? The answer is far from simple. Reconstructed in a stylized form,
we see that the reform path in the sphere of the administration of justice is incomplete:
steps making the system more efficient have not accompanied the strengthening of the
rule of law (access to courts), the separation of powers and the independence of the
judiciary. There are several possible explanations of this incompleteness. 
• Financial strain. This is the most obvious reason, related to the tight budgetary
policies of the transformation period. The administration of justice is not an
exception, as all public services suffer a lack of adequate funding. They also all
compete for scarce resources during each budget making cycle. What is striking
is the low appreciation of the unique importance of the court system for the
overall functioning of the state and the economy.
• Collective interests. Judges act as a group defending their interests; during the
constitutional process, for example, most of their demands were accepted almost
with no discussion (Osiatyński, 2003a). More generally, in this case, the logic of
collective action described by Mancur Olson (1965) seems to be relevant: the small
lobby of judges has a stronger incentive to retain the status quo than the large body
of citizens that would benefit from changes has to actively work for reform.
• Deficient lawmaking. The quality of the legislative process is low (Dobrowolski et
al., 2004). Part of the reason is the lobbying of interest groups, usual in any
democracy, although still badly regulated in Poland. Another reason are poor
procedures employed in designing and drafting the regulations by the executive
branch. This is clearly related to the low quality of the public administration,
analyzed in the previous sub-sections, as one of the principal tasks of the central
public administration is to draft new regulations. Moreover, there are equally
poor procedures in the parliament. That often leads to outright errors and
contradictions, which have to be amended quickly. (Amendment of recently
passed laws is a recurring nightmare of the Polish parliament.) Poor lawmaking
procedures are often leading to unintended and unforeseen consequences. Not
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surprisingly, as Siemaszko (in Zieliński, Zubik, 2002, 120) assesses, the
lawmakers are usually not aware of the consequences of legislative changes for
the courts’ work-load.
• Poor economic thinking. The understanding of economics among the wider public,
lawmakers, and the legal profession is poor. The discipline of economics of justice,
in particular, is neither taught nor practiced. Neither lawyers nor lawmakers have
either the methodology or the inclination to look upon their work in terms of inputs,
outputs and efficiency. At best, the direct costs related to new regulations are
estimated. But there is no thinking in terms of how the incentive structure of altered
regulations would affect the behavior of various actors and, in consequence, how it
would impinge upon economic efficiency of a given institution.
• Low perception of the importance of the state. Last but not least, there is a low
appreciation of the importance of the state and low social capacity of state
building in Poland, mentioned already at the end of the previous sub-section. This
is caused both by the alienating experience of the communist period, and also by
the much longer historical experience of a society which did not go through the
classical Western pattern – it had no absolutism in the seventeenth and eighteenth
century, no constitutionalism and nation state building in the nineteenth, and very
little democracy and rule of law in the twentieth.
37
UNDERSTANDING REFORM: THE CASE OF POLAND
CASE Reports No. 59
As mentioned above, the initial reform package (the so-called Balcerowicz Plan,
named after the Minister of Finance, Leszek Balcerowicz) consisted primarily of
measures aimed at the macroeconomic stabilization and liberalization of the national
economy. The package, which came into effect on January 1, 1990, consisted of five
major components: (1) a restrictive monetary policy, (2) elimination of the budget
deficit, (3) further liberalization of prices (price liberalization had already begun under
the Communists), (4) the introduction of current account convertibility of the Polish
currency, and (5) a restrictive tax-based income policy designed to fight inflation. 
It is important to note that this package had been preceded by a number of
significant liberalizing reforms undertaken during the last two years of Communist
party rule. One of these reforms was the introduction of a two-tier banking system (nine
independent regional commercial banks were hived off of the National Bank of Poland
in 1988). On August 1, 1989, shortly before handing over power to Solidarity (which
occurred on 12 September), the ruling Communist party made steps toward price
reform, eliminating the system of food rationing which had existed since the early
1980s. Coupled with the indexation which permeated the economy, increases in the
autonomy of enterprises allowing for very strong wage growth, and an accommodating
monetary policy (interest-free financing of the budget deficit by the central bank), this
led to near-hyperinflation (Dąbrowski, 1995).
The specific measures of the Balcerowicz stabilization and liberalization reform
package included the following:
• High interest rates designed to bring down inflation, supplemented by an income-
based tax policy (based on the so-called popiwek tax, a tax on monthly increases
in enterprises’ wage bills exceeding a coefficient revised monthly by the Finance
Ministry) which was to serve as a “nominal anchor”;
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4. Stabilization and liberalization
reforms
• Price liberalization (with price controls remaining in effect for coal and coke7,
energy, public transportation, pharmaceuticals and rents in public housing);
• The introduction of very low tariffs in the third quarter of 1990, and
• The introduction of a fixed exchange rate to serve as a second “nominal anchor”8
(the Polish zloty was pegged to the US dollar); the pegging of the rate was
preceded by a significant devaluation. 
Anti-trust policy, also an element of the Balcerowicz Plan, will be discussed briefly
in Section 5.2.1. 
4.1. The actors in the design and implementation of the reform
package
In the summer of 1989, while the Communists continued to try to govern and
Solidarity leaders began talking amongst themselves about the possibility of forming a
government, Harvard economist Jeffrey Sachs, who had worked as an economic
advisor to several Latin American governments and was especially well known for his
contribution to the Bolivian stabilization program of the mid-1980s, began travelling to
Poland at this point to advise the Solidarity group. He was successful in convincing
Solidarity parliamentarians of the necessity to rapidly end hyperinflation and move
quickly toward a market economy. When Tadeusz Mazowiecki became prime minister
in August, he spoke of his need to find a “Polish Erhard,” referring to Ludwig Erhard,
the author of West Germany’s “economic miracle” (Kuroń, Żakowski, 1997). After a
brief search, the man found to fill this role was Leszek Balcerowicz, who became
finance minister. The team Balcerowicz created when he began work in the Ministry of
Finance was drawn in part from a group which had worked with him to design an
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two separate purposes. The tax-based incomes policy was intended to defuse the wage-price spiral
generating inflation, whereas the pegging of the exchange rate was to serve the maintenance of the
country’s external balance. Some thought the up-front devaluation was unnecessary and could even be
harmful in creating additional inflationary pressure. However, Gomułka (1995), in his role as government
adviser, argued that it was necessary in order to stimulate exports and restrict imports, thereby
stimulating accumulation of foreign currency reserves, which were at very low levels. He also disagreed
with those who saw the fixed exchange rate as a tool for reducing inflation. In his opinion, the exchange
rate’s efficacy as a policy tool was limited to restoration of the country’s external balance, while the
appropriate tools for fighting inflation lay in the areas of monetary, fiscal, and incomes policies.
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economic reform program in 1981, and partly from among a group of reform-minded
economists who had participated in a series of seminars he had led at the Warsaw
School of Planning and Statistics during the 1980s. These seminars had been devoted
to the problems of the socialist economy, and participants had discussed a broad range
of possible solutions, including fairly radical ones such as privatization and other forms
of ownership transformation. As a result, these people had had almost a decade of
intellectual preparation behind them as they embarked on the reform process (Gach,
1993). However, the role of Sachs remained very important, with his prestige
legitimizing the Balcerowicz team’s work in the eyes of many Poles while he played the
role of an advocate for Poland on the international scene (e.g., in calling for a reduction
of the tremendous foreign debt the country had accumulated during the 1970s). In
early October 1989, less than one month after Balcerowicz became finance minister,
Poland’s economic reform plan was even referred to in The New York Times as “the
Sachs Plan” (Wayne, 1989). Other foreign advisers also played important roles,
especially a group of three economists of Polish origin or extraction – Stanisław Wellisz
from the United States, and Stanisław Gomułka and Jacek Rostowski from the United
Kingdom (the work of the latter two was financed by the British Know-How Fund).
Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize that despite the important role played by
foreign advisers, the Polish reform package was definitely “locally owned,” conceived
and designed by Balcerowicz’s team (though some particularly demagogic critics often
portrayed the Balcerowicz team as being lackeys of the international financial
institutions). In fact, there were often disagreements between the team and its foreign
advisers, and the former did not hesitate to carry out their plans over the protests of
foreign advisers and international financial institutions in such cases. For example,
many experts, including those at the IMF, interpreted the high enterprise profits of 1990
falsely, seeing them as a consequence of exercise of monopoly power by enterprises
rather than a simple accounting phenomenon resulting from the low nominal purchase
costs of inputs relative to the sales prices of outputs in a highly inflationary environment.
As a result of this misinterpretation, many experts advocated postponing price
liberalization until state enterprises were broken up. It is interesting to note that in this
and other cases of disagreement with the Polish reform team, foreign advisers from the
World Bank and the IMF usually ended up accepting the Polish view (Gomułka, 1995).
Some other cases of such changes of opinion will be discussed in Section 5.2.2
(concerning privatization policy and the restructuring of banks’ bad debt portfolios).
The team which designed the Balcerowicz Plan has often been characterized as
working in splendid isolation, above – and oblivious to – the political fray. According to
this characterization, this was a group of technocrats which believed in the necessity of
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insulating itself from the political process, which the group saw exclusively as a
potential source of pressures for divergence from the optimal reform path. The team
thus portrayed saw themselves as experts responsible for carrying out a technical
operation which they alone were competent to perform, and regarded all discussion
and debate as a hindrance. However, the reality was much more complex, and the
stabilization-liberalization program was implemented in an increasingly stormy
political environment. The reformers were an embattled group, and the unpopularity
of the reform measures and criticisms of the team itself had an effect on later actions
as the implementation of the reforms unfolded. We discuss some aspects of this
complex situation below.
Controversies among the general public and economists opposed, for various
reasons, to the government’s program began to rage within months after the
introduction of the reform package, reaching a high level by the late spring of 1990.
Many critics were of the opinion that the initial recession was of a Keynesian nature
and could be overcome by using Keynesian stimulatory measures, and therefore
advocated that the austerity measures of the reform package be reversed. 
Contrary to popular opinion, the team of reformers in the Finance Ministry was not
insensitive to criticism or convinced of its own infallibility. Mechanisms were set up to
monitor the effects of policies as well as to identify and deal with new issues as they
arose, and chief policy makers, including Balcerowicz himself, were open to
suggestions about changing the course of policy. In fact, we will argue that they may
have been too open to such suggestions as criticism grew heavier from increasingly
broad segments of society, and that this tendency strengthened over the course of the
ensuing decade.
Jerzy Koźmiński, initially director general and then undersecretary of state in the
office of the cabinet (Polish acronym: URM), was responsible for communication with
the media and for setting up the mechanisms for monitoring the progress of the
reforms. He organized three groups at URM, one for monitoring the economy, one for
public opinion research, and an intervention staff working for the cabinet’s economic
committee (a cabinet committee consisting of ministers with economic portfolios such
as finance, industry, privatization, etc.). The first prepared reports every month on
production, prices, wages, pensions, inventories, foreign reserves, execution of the
budget, foreign trade, and the like (Gach, 1993).
On the basis of this feedback as well as social and political pressure decisions were
made concerning modification of the reform program. The first such case was a
relaxation of austerity measures in mid-1990, made in response to farmer and rail
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worker strikes. This consisted of a reduction of interest rates by the National Bank of
Poland (the refinance rate dropped from 54% to 31% in annual terms) and an increase
in the wage bill growth norms for the popiwek (Dąbrowski et al., 1991; Gach, 1993;
Crombrugghe, 1995). The changes were proposed by the NBP, and Balcerowicz agreed
(on the advice of Stanisław Gomułka, who argued that this was necessary to correct
“excessive overshooting” [Gomułka, 1995]). Deputy Minister Marek Dąbrowski
resigned in protest, and Balcerowicz admitted later that he had made a mistake in
agreeing to this set of concessions to various groups of “transformation losers” (to use
the terminology employed in our discussion of hypothesis 5 in section 2). 
Unfortunately, while information about popular perceptions flowed regularly to the
Balcerowicz team, there was a much smaller corresponding flow of information from
the reform team. The only member of the Mazowiecki government who made intensive
efforts to educate the society about the character and goals of the reforms was one who
was not directly involved in the Balcerowicz team (although his efforts to communicate
the rationale behind the reforms to Polish society were based on his frequent discussions
with members of that team). Jacek Kuroń, who had been one of the best-known leaders
of the anti-Communist opposition and became the minister of labor under the
Mazowiecki government, played a very important role in explaining reforms to society
through weekly television appearances. Kuroń was a highly charismatic figure who
throughout the first half of the 1990s was not only the most popular politician in Poland
but also the only one who consistently received high approval ratings from a large
majority of the Polish population. Kuroń, who had always been connected with the
democratic left and whose political tendencies were clearly of a social democratic
nature, was perceived as a person of great compassion and human warmth, and at the
same time was seen as being absolutely above suspicion of corruption or any ulterior
motives. These perceptions made his arguments concerning the need for transition to a
market economy particularly credible for the populace, including many of those whose
material welfare was adversely affected in the initial stages of the transition. This was
one of the all too few deliberate efforts made at the time to create a group of “reform
advocates” (again using the terminology from the discussion of hypothesis 5 in section
2) in Polish society, although Koźmiński, in his interview, argued persuasively that there
were too few resources – in terms of time and personnel – available to the Balcerowicz
team to engage in this activity on a larger scale.
Other factors complicating the political environment in which the Balcerowicz
team acted included the attitude of the rest of the government (in particular, Prime
Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki) and the lack of ability of those who opposed the team’s
program to formulate a coherent alternative plan which could be put forward for
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debate. According to one interviewee who had been a member of the Balcerowicz team,
Prime Minister Mazowiecki tended to take a neutral standpoint with regard to the
reform program, and the government’s press speaker, Małgorzata Niezabitowska, was
openly critical. (According to the interviewee, one of the main problems for the
Balcerowicz team was the fact that, in the first year or two of the reforms, many
persons both in the government and the parliament had a poor understanding of the
nature and workings of the market economy – they knew in theory that Poland needed
a market economy, but they had very little idea what that meant in practice.) As a result,
the government as a whole refused to actively support the reform package, and the
reform team was left to defend it by itself (with some help from Jacek Kuroń).
Moreover, as Kuroń has noted, the tendency to isolate the government from the
Solidarity trade union and its representatives in the parliament was due primarily to
the approach of Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki. Mazowiecki and his government
tended to see the union and its parliamentary representation as simply serving the role
of an “umbrella” for the government, shielding it from criticism from the rank-and-file
members. The latter were not to take an active role in shaping the new Poland. In fact,
this often irritated Bronisław Geremek, leader of the Solidarity parliamentary faction,
but in spite of this he agreed to play the umbrella role and supported the government
(Kuroń, Żakowski, 1997). These constitute other important failures to create groups of
“reform advocates” – even within the reform government itself.
Outside government circles, some of the most vocal critics of the reform program
in the parliament did not block it when it was time to vote. In the opinion of the
aforementioned interviewee, these people were unable to develop an alternative
program. This was true of both the post-Communist and post-Solidarity critics of the
program. The only party, he said, which was willing to actively block the program was
the PSL (the peasant party), but this party was too weak to successfully block legislation
in the parliament.
Nonetheless, in spite of all the foregoing qualifications, there was a strongly
technocratic character to the reforms and the process by which they were designed and
implemented. However, we will argue that this was due at least as much to the
character of the reforms themselves as it was to the personalities of the reformers.
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4.2. The technical nature of the liberalization and stabilization
reform
Stabilization is by nature a highly technical operation, involving the setting of
parameters such as exchange rates and interest rates, as well as the entire range of
budget planning and central banking. Even in the most developed democracies these
are matters which are reserved for well-trained professionals (though decisions are
subject, sometimes, to debate in the legislature, and decision makers are periodically
subject to approval by the legislature). Moreover, even with the best team of
professional economists, stabilization programs are fraught with dangers of a technical
nature. In fact, the Balcerowicz team made numerous technical errors (mostly in the
area of forecasting) in the implementation of the reform. The technical dangers facing
policy makers implementing a stabilization program under conditions of systemic
transformation are summed up well by Gomułka (1995): 
The starting point for a macroeconomic program designer is usually the price path
[...] The second major step in designing a program involves the use of the Fisher
equation to determine the quarterly changes in the quantity of money that are
consistent with the targeted price path [...] At this stage, assumptions have to be
made about the level of real GDP and the velocity of money circulation. Again, in a
period of systemic transformation, the risks are that the assumptions adopted are
seriously wrong, as in Poland in 1990 and in 1991. 
Specifically, he refers to forecasts of GDP growth in 1990 and 1991 of –3.5% and
+3.5% respectively, as against the actually realized growth rates of –11.4% and –7.4%9.
Other errors he lists concern the level of corrective inflation in early 1990, which was
much higher than the Finance Ministry forecasts (however, low inflation forecasts
helped the government meet fiscal targets and achieve a budget surplus in 1990, as
higher forecasts would have necessitated higher adjustments in public sector wages,
pensions and other transfer payments). These errors, which resulted in over-fulfillment
of IMF budget deficit targets (a sizable surplus instead of a deficit), led some critics to
complain of “overshooting.” As mentioned above, these criticisms were often coupled
with claims that the output decline which accompanied the beginning of the Polish
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transition was of a Keynesian nature and required Keynesian expansionary monetary
and fiscal policies to remedy it. 
However, it should be clear by now that the recession was of an entirely different
nature. Hungarian economist Janos Kornai coined the expression “transformational
recession” to refer to recessions caused by the need to restructure output in formerly
centrally planned economies (Kornai, 1995). The underlying idea is that because both
the quality and quantity of output were vastly different from those which would have
been produced in a market economy in response to consumer demand, an output
decline is necessitated by the fact that enterprises must cease to produce output not
satisfying consumer tastes before they can adjust in order to begin to satisfy market
demand. In the Polish case, this is evidenced by the figures cited by Bratkowski (1995a)
for 1991, when GDP dropped in Poland by 7.6%10, while consumption rose by 3.3%.
Moreover, as short as the recession was in comparison with most other transition
countries, it probably would have been even shorter if it had not been for the collapse
of CMEA trade in 1991. Although the reorientation of Poland’s trade had already been
substantial (we will discuss this below), this eliminated export markets which remained
significant for Poland. The causes of this external shock, however, were similar to those
of the transformational recession, lying in the elimination of an institution (the
Committee for Mutual Economic Assistance) which regulated trade on the basis of
planners’ preferences rather than market forces. 
Not only did many critics fail to recognize these important differences between a
new kind of recession specific to the conditions of the post-Communist transition, but
they also were frequently in error about basic economic facts. Many critics, for
example, continued to call for Keynesian stimulatory measures (larger deficits, lower
interest rates and slower disinflation) long after the recession had ended. In the spring
of 1991, President Lech Wałęsa organized a conference in the presidential palace on
the economic policies of the government. This was used by economists opposed to the
Balcerowicz program as a forum for criticism of the program. But the tone and content
of the criticism was a good indicator of the extent to which the opposition was
intellectually unprepared to discuss the program or develop a coherent alternative.
Critical remarks concerned, for example, the lack of democratic legitimacy of the
government as a result of its failure to represent any concrete interest groups such as
farmers or blue-collar workers, deliberate sabotage of the economy by the government,
and the accusations that decisions on economic policy were really being made in the
offices of the IMF and Polish state property being sold for “pennies” to foreign capital.
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It is worth remembering that these remarks were made by economists, including some
of the country’s better-known professors (Gach, 1993).
This brings us back to the claim of our interviewee that there were few people in
Poland at the beginning of the transition who were able to go beyond sweeping slogans
concerning a “Third Way,” a “socialist (or social) market economy” or a labor-managed
economy and formulate a consistent and detailed reform package which could have
served as an alternative to the Balcerowicz team’s program. This is probably one of the
reasons why many of the post-Communist parliamentarians voted in favor of the
Balcerowicz reform package in late 1989 – they found themselves in a situation which
they were poorly equipped to understand. Because of this, it took time for even poor,
pseudo-Keynesian criticisms of the program to take shape. And during that time,
urgent action was needed. However, it is also true that there was an urgent need for
education of the society, of parliamentarians, and of economists, both to improve the
quality of the policy debate and, more importantly, to enable people to participate more
effectively in the economic life of Poland’s new market economy. If there is an area
where one can fault the authors of the stabilization and liberalization package, it is in
their failure to make adequate efforts in the area of education. However, it is also worth
noting that the technical nature of this reform package which, in our opinion, made a
technocratic approach necessary, also made it possible; that is, successful
implementation of the package was possible in the absence of highly developed public
administrative capacity. Thus, this reform also constitutes an exception to the rule (if
rule it is) we formulated in Hypothesis 3 (which in turn probably contributed to the
negligence in the area of public administration reform referred to in that hypothesis).
4.3. Initial results of the Balcerowicz reform package
The results of the reform package after one year included: 
• The elimination of the shortages which had plagued the centrally planned economy;
• A sharp decline in inflation, which was brought under control by beginning of
second quarter of 1990 (when the monthly inflation rate came down to under
10%, from over 70% in January); 
• A budget surplus for 1990;
• A decline in GDP, and 
• Growth of unemployment (official unemployment was probably also overestimated
for reasons we will return to in a moment).
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One of the negative effects, the GDP decline, proved to be the most moderate and
short-lived GDP decline in the transition countries, and even so was probably
overestimated, if one takes into account the rapid growth of the gray sector (i.e.,
unregistered economic activity) beginning in 1990 (Bratkowski, 1995a).
However, some of the positive effects were also short-lived. The favorable fiscal
situation was to be reversed drastically in 1991, as a surplus was turned into a deep
deficit. We will discuss this in more detail in Section 4.4.
As in the case of the fiscal balance, the reform package led to a trade surplus in
1990 which became a deficit in the following year. This was due to the fact that
continued high inflation was coupled with the fixed exchange rate (as well as the
depreciation of the leading European currencies against the US dollar), leading to the
real appreciation of the zloty (Dąbrowski, 1995).
One of the most important goals of the reform package was to harden the budget
constraints of state-owned enterprises11. In general, this was largely a success,
although there was an important group of enterprises for which this failed. While
subsidies from the state budget were discontinued, the state-owned banks continued a
very liberal lending policy toward a privileged group of “regular customers” consisting
of the large state-owned enterprises with which they had been cooperating for years
under conditions not even remotely resembling banking in a market economy. The
latter used this access to credit (in spite of high interest rates) in order to maintain
liquidity, which resulted in a high rate of growth of their indebtedness, and of the bad
credit portfolio of the banks (Bratkowski, 1995a). This problem, and its solution, is
discussed in greater detail in Section 5.2.2.
One of the most important, dramatic, and positive changes resulting from the
systemic change (and one which was effected almost immediately) was the shift in
Poland’s export markets from the CMEA countries to those of the European Union and
European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA). Whereas in 1988 export to developed market
economies represented 39.7%, and export to the CMEA 42.7%, of the country’s exports,
only two years later, in 1990, export to the EU and EFTA represented 60.5%, and export
to Central and Eastern European countries and the former Soviet Union only 23.7%, of
Polish exports (RCSS, 2002). Of course, this is an adjustment which was made by
enterprises in response to changes in their environment, and the issue of enterprise
adjustment and restructuring is the subject of Section 5.2.
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In this context, we would like to make another observation concerning the
technical errors of the reform team, discussed above, which led to accusations of
“overshooting.” This is that it was better to err on the side of caution (restrictive
policies) than on the side of excessively expansionary policies. The costs of
expansionary policies adopted as concessions in response to political pressures are
demonstrated by the experience related to the reduction of interest rates in mid-1990.
Within two months the volume of credit provided by the banks had grown to an extent
which led to renewed inflationary pressures, with output growing by 15% in the second
half of 1990. Even Gomułka (1995) admits that the relaxation of the second half of 1990
was excessive, and claims that this was due to the fact that wage increases were larger
than anticipated, which he attributes in turn to the December presidential election. He
goes on to note that the revival of inflation “forced the authorities to tighten monetary
policy sharply at the end of 1990 and the beginning of 1991, which in turn may have
accentuated somewhat the recessionary impact of the CMEA collapse in the first half
of 1991.” The central bank refinance rate went back up to 55% in December 1990 and
70% in January 1991. This restrictive policy was necessary in order to restore the
credibility of the stabilization policy, which had been seriously undermined, changing
the expectations of enterprise directors (Bratkowski, 1995a). Thus, it is likely that
maintaining a consistently restrictive policy from the beginning would have been less
costly than the attempt to accommodate political pressures with expansionary policies.
4.4. Later developments
In this section we will discuss progress and new reforms in specific areas related
to liberalization and stabilization which occurred after the first year of implementation
of the initial reform package. Some issues of policy in the normal sense (as opposed to
the more radical types of changes which we classify as reforms) are also dealt with to
the extent that they bear upon the fate of reforms enacted as part of the stabilization-
liberalization program at the outset of the Polish transition. We can observe a pattern
of small reversals: while reforms had been introduced on a grand scale, reversals often
came in the form of small steps within the much more prosaic realm of day-to-day
policy, and their cumulative effect was to weaken (and sometimes threaten to
undermine) the effects of the initial reform package.
Central bank independence. In 1989 a law had been adopted according to which the
governor of the NBP was nominated by the president and confirmed by the Sejm.
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Additional 1991 legislation set the NBP president’s term of office at six years and
additionally made it impossible to replace him or her during this period except in cases
of resignation or criminal prosecution. However, a requirement that the NBP’s
monetary program be accepted by the Sejm each year remained in place. In 1997,
legislation was adopted which led to the creation of the Monetary Policy Council (Polish
acronym: RPP) in 1998. This body has ten members: the president of the NBP, three
nominated by the President of the Republic, three by the Senate, and three by the Sejm.
The members have six-year terms, like the NBP president; thus, this represents an
improvement over the previous situation, in which direct parliamentary approval of
monetary policy was required. Moreover, relevant legislation (including the Constitution
adopted in 1997) declares that the primary goal of monetary policy is price stability. 
Exchange rate and trade policy. As a correction to the real appreciation of the zloty
during the period in which a fixed exchange rate was in place, the zloty was devalued
by 17% in May 1991 and crawling peg regime introduced (using a basket of five
currencies). Shortly thereafter, the far-reaching trade liberalization of 1990 was
reversed when tariffs were raised to a level higher on average than the average level of
the beginning of 1990 (Wellisz, 1994; Dąbrowski, 1995). (Interestingly, this example of
policy reversal concerns the liberals who introduced the original policy.) Since then,
tariffs have in general gradually been reduced, largely as a result of the need to bring
them in line with EU levels. In 1994 and 1995 the band of acceptable exchange rate
fluctuations was widened. Then, in the summer of 1998, the NBP began to move in the
direction of a full-blown exchange rate regime reform (given the fundamental nature of
this change of course, the process was carried out remarkably quietly). It ceased direct
interventions on the foreign exchange market, and 11 months later indirect
interventions were also halted; in April 2000 the clean float policy which had been
pursued de facto since 1998 was adopted officially. As we can see from the 1999-2000
figures on the balance of payments in Table 1, Poland experienced a dangerous external
imbalance in those years, which led to widespread predictions of an imminent currency
crisis. The clean float regime probably played an important role in avoiding such a
crisis during this period12.
The growth of imports which turned Poland’s balance of trade negative for much
of the 1990s certainly need not be interpreted negatively. Much of this was due to the
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need to modernize the country’s dilapidated capital stock, and for this purpose the
decade saw a large-scale import of capital goods.
Inflation and monetary policy. The battle against inflation continued to be waged
throughout the 1990s, albeit sometimes with more, sometimes with greater energy.
Generally, however, progress was made continuously, and as disinflation proceeded
throughout the course of the decade, one could observe the steady increase in the
monetization of the economy (see Table 1.1). However, these gains were threatened when,
following the drop to single-digit inflation in 1998, the monetary authorities (as in mid-
1990) reacted with an excessive loosening of monetary policy, with drastic consequences
(1999 inflation was higher than in the previous year for the first time since the beginning
of the transformation), forcing an equally drastic re-tightening. Ironically, excessive
loosening of monetary policy coincided more or less with the RPP’s adoption of a policy
of direct inflation targeting. In defense of the RPP we can say that the renewed burst of
inflation was not only caused by interest rate cuts. The deterioration of the fiscal situation,
which we will discuss in greater detail below, created greater inflationary pressure than
expected (due, among other things, to the Finance Ministry’s use of increases in the excise
tax on gasoline to stop the gap). For most of 2000 monthly inflation exceeded annualized
levels of 10%, and the RPP reacted with steep interest rate hikes. This in turn gave rise to
a period in which disinflation proceeded more rapidly than had been expected; for
example, the RPP’s declared goal of reducing inflation to under 4% by 2003 was already
attained in 2001 (RCSS, 2002). As in the cases of the 1990 expansionary policy reversal
and the tariff policy reversal in 1991, in this case we observe first, a reversal of policy, and
then a return to the original course (with the need, in two of these cases, to correct the
reversal with a policy more restrictive than the original policy) by the same group – these
changes were not associated with changes in the ruling party. 
Populist forces have consistently called for a significant relaxation of monetary
policy, and successive governments (despite what their members may have said while
they were in opposition, or even during their terms of office) have consistently failed to
meet these demands. There is a general consensus that this has been due to the fact that
various Polish governments have understood the constraints imposed by the
international environment, in which Poland’s status as a borrower on international
markets, as well as its status as a candidate for EU membership, would be seriously
jeopardized by the adoption of a recklessly expansive monetary policy and a full-blown
frontal assault on central bank independence. Constitutional safeguards of the
independence of the RPP have also played an important role here. As we shall see, this
has not been the case with respect to fiscal policy, where international pressure is
weaker (it is difficult to press Poland to maintain a responsible fiscal policy when the
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US budget deficit is at record levels and the leading Western European nation’s deficits
are also allowed to exceed Maastricht limits without adverse consequences) and policy
is directly subject to the electoral cycle.
Fiscal policy. The serious revenue decline experienced in 1991-1992 was alleviated by
the introduction of the personal income tax on 1 January, 1992, and VAT on 5 July, 1993.
However, several analyses show that the fiscal problems of the early transition period (in
particular 1991-1992) were due not to declines in revenues from the contracting enterprise
sector, as was often argued by the austerity program’s critics, but rather to the expansion
of expenditures, primarily on retirement and disability pensions (Barbone, Marchetti,
1995; Bratkowski, 1993). The fall in revenue from enterprises was compensated by the
reduction in subsidies to enterprises. The problem with social transfers, on the other hand,
resulted from three policies adopted by the Labor Ministry at the outset of the transition:
first, the extremely liberal eligibility criteria for unemployment benefits; second, the policy
of indexing pensions to wage growth instead of price growth, and third, the policy of
encouraging early retirement in state enterprises. (The eligibility criteria for
unemployment benefits actually caused persons who had never worked before to enter the
labor market – as registered unemployed.) While some of the effects of the policy on
eligibility for unemployment benefits were probably unintended results of mistakes made
by Labor Minister Jacek Kuroń and his advisers, there was certainly a conscious decision
to ameliorate the consequences of the transition (in the form of employment reductions in
state-owned enterprises) by allowing enterprises to reduce bloated work forces in a way
which would be as painless as possible for all concerned (i.e., early retirement). The early
retirement, in turn, led to a 28% growth in the number of pensioners in the period 1990-
1993 (with 12% growth in 1991 alone), against annual growth rates of 2-3% in the previous
three years. These mistakes gave Poland one of the highest dependency ratios in Europe,
and their correction was a very long and gradual process, lasting about five years
(Dąbrowski, 1995; Bratkowski, 1995a; Barbone, Marchetti, 1995).
Poland’s fiscal situation was relatively stable in the high growth years of 1993-1998.
However, if we consider the high rates of growth of those years, it is hard to avoid the
conclusion that the public sector deficits were too high – approaching, and even in one
year exceeding, the Maastricht limit of 3% of GDP (see Table 1.1) – especially given the
fact that investment spending by the Polish central government is very low, consistently
representing around 5% of the state budget13. These fat years represent a missed
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opportunity for a much-needed structural reform of Polish public finances, which
would reduce the burden of transfer payments and increase expenditure on badly
needed investments in the education system and infrastructure.
Today, the country once again finds itself in a fiscal crisis, the roots of which lie in
the implementation of four reforms – of the pension system, the education system, the
health care system, and public administration – which began in 1999. The fiscal
consequences of these reforms were apparent to alert observers well before the
appropriate legislation was passed. At the end of 1998, when the parliament was
preparing to pass the legislation introducing the four reforms, social policy expert and
former deputy labor minister Aleksandra Wiktorow stated that the retirement
insurance reform should be delayed by one year to allow time for proper preparation
of the system (Cichocka, 2001).
The fiscal problems resulting from the reform package became visible very quickly.
As we can see in Table 4.1, by the end of February of 1999, the first year of the “four
reforms”, the budget deficit had reached nearly 58% of the level planned for the entire
year (as opposed to 14.2% at the end of February 1998 and 11.4% at the end of
February 1997). This was largely due to increased expenditures associated with the
reform of the health sector (the creation of health insurance funds – kasy chorych) and
of the pension system. As a result of the latter reform (specifically, of the failure to
prepare the computerization of the new system adequately before bringing it into
operation), the social insurance fund (Polish acronym: ZUS) began experiencing
problems with the collection of monthly payroll contributions (Stasik, 1999a), as well
as with the transfer of a percentage of those contributions to private pension funds in
the case of many insured persons. 
Probably the biggest source of problems lies in the problems experienced in
implementation of the pension system reform. This reform is discussed in detail in
Section 6. Here we are concerned only with the effects on public finances. These have
been considerable. ZUS debt to the private pension funds amounted to 9.5 billion zlotys
as of end of March 2003 (Stec 2003). Five years after the initiation of the pension reform,
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Source: Stasik (1999a, 2001).
Table 4.1. Budget deficit realization in February and at end of first quarter, 1997-2001
(% of total planned of the year)
Year End of February End of first quarter
1997 11.4 n.a.
1998 14.2 n.a.
1999 57.7 70.2
2000 29.3 45.1
2001 58.2 73.3
ZUS still claimed to be unable to identify many payers for whom it has not transferred
funds to the private funds, and thus this debt continued to accumulate during that
period. These problems are due to the fact that the government was in a great hurry to
implement this reform as well as the other reforms in its reform package as early as
possible. The reasoning behind this was that the reforms should be implemented as early
as possible during the four-year term of office so that the voters would have forgotten
any difficulties in the early phase of their implementation by the time of the next
election. Because of this concession to electoral calculus, the implementation was
rushed, and the system was put in place before the necessary computerization was
completed. And the difficulties turned out to be greater than anyone had expected.
These problems were compounded in the preparation of the budget for 2000 by the
Finance Ministry’s adoption of unrealistic assumptions for expenditure plans and
revenue forecasts. This did not go unnoticed by commentators, including RPP member
Boguslaw Grabowski and CASE analyst Andrzej Bratkowski, who said that the 2000
budget assumptions concerning GDP growth and inflation were too optimistic (Stasik,
1999b). Similar mistakes were made in the planning of the 2001 budget. Again, Finance
Ministry macroeconomic forecasts for the 2001 budget plan came under serious
criticism. Especially strong criticism was reserved for the forecasted revenues from
sales of concessions for UMTS, the third-generation cellular telephone system (Stasik,
2000; Mackiewicz, 2000). Witold Skrok, director of the department of financial policy,
analysis and statistics in the Ministry of Finance, resigned in protest soon after the
Ministry announced its budget plan (Gadomski, 2000). The differences between
Finance Ministry and assumptions concerning key macroeconomic indicators and the
actually realized values are presented in Table 4.2.
Meanwhile, as mentioned above, the Finance Ministry used increases in the excise
tax on gasoline14 as one stop-gap measure to reduce the deficit. A number of other
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* Yearly average.
Source: Borowski (2000, 2001, 2002).
Table 4.2. Finance Ministry's planned macroeconomic indicators, and actual ones, 1999-2001
Level forecast by Ministry of Finance
in budget projections
Actual level
Year
GDP growth Unemployment Inflation* GDP growth Unemployment Inflation*
1999 5.1% 9.4% 8.5% 4.1% 13.0% 7.3%
2000 5.2% 11.5% 5.7% 4.1% 15.0% 10.1%
2001 4.5% 15.4% 7.0% 1.1% 17.4% 5.5%
measures were resorted to, which amounted to accounting tricks which pushed
expenditures into the next budget year. For example, the inflation adjustments to
pensions made in 2000 were too low, although ministry officials realized that this
would mean that expenditures would have to rise in 2001 in order to compensate
pensioners (RCSS, 2002). In this manner, the official deficit numbers for 1999 and
2000 were held relatively low, although the Maastricht threshold of 3% of GDP was
exceeded (see Table 1.1). 
This tactic could not work forever, however. In the summer of 2000, Finance
Minister Leszek Balcerowicz and his party left the government, and in November, with
just over a month left in the year, Deputy Finance Minister Halina Wasilewska-Trenkner
announced that expenditures would have to be cut by 3.8 billion zlotys in order to
maintain the deficit at the planned level of 15.4 billion zlotys. Analysis showed that this
was a result of two factors. First, in response to promises made in late 1998 by
Balcerowicz to eliminate the tax deduction for new housing construction, many more
people used this deduction in 1999 than foreseen in ministry forecasts (nominally, use
of this deduction increased 80 percent for the tax year 1999 in comparison to the
previous year), and for this reason tax offices had to return much more money to
taxpayers in 2000 than had been planned. Second, planned subsidies for ZUS were too
low, making it necessary to increase the subsidy to ZUS by almost 2.1 billion zlotys,
from 900 million zlotys to almost 3 billion (Jędrzejewska, 2000).
Finally, in the summer of 2001, just before the general election and after months of
denying the existence of a problem, Finance Minister Jarosław Bauc announced that
Poland’s budget was in crisis. Bauc was quickly fired by the prime minister, but this did
not help matters – the ruling party was dealt a crushing defeat by the voters, and the
year was closed with a public sector deficit of 5.1% of GDP.
Finally, with regard to the country’s unsolved, and worsening, fiscal problems, we
would like to draw attention to Stanley Fischer’s (1989) comment on Milton Friedman’s
famous statement that inflation always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon.
Fischer noted that monetary authorities usually print money in response to fiscal
pressures (concretely, in response to the need to finance deficits), and that very high
inflation is therefore almost always a fiscal phenomenon. Looking at the history of Polish
deficit financing and inflation in the transition, we note that the NBP financed 100% of
the deficit in 1989, 80% in 1991, 52% in 1992, 65% in 1993, and 30% in 1994
(Bratkowski, 1995b). Clearly there is a strong relationship between inflation and central
bank deficit financing (monetary accommodation of fiscal policy), bearing out Fischer’s
observation. The 1997 Constitution took an important step in the direction of reducing
the inflationary effects of fiscal policy by banning NBP financing of government deficits.
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4.5. Assessment
Was the initial stabilization and liberalization reform package a success? How
should we evaluate the follow-up over the course of the ensuing decade?
In terms of both goals and results, the initial reform package can be judged as an
overall success. Almost fourteen years after the beginning of the Polish reform process,
we can state with confidence that the battle with inflation has been won, but the battle
for fiscal consolidation is in a critical stage. The fact that monetary policy has remained
on a more or less restrictive course and the independence of the monetary authorities
not seriously challenged is probably due in large measure to the constraints imposed
by the international environment, in which Poland’s status as a borrower and candidate
for EU membership would have been threatened by serious policy reversals in this
area. This seems consistent with our sixth hypothesis. We have argued, moreover, that
the success of this reform package is evidence in favor of our first hypothesis – that it
represents a success of the “technocratic” process in preparing a reform of a very
technical nature which only a handful of the country’s economists were professionally
qualified to deal with at the outset of the transition.
Returning to the issue of “technocratic” versus participatory reform design and
implementation approaches, we argue (oversimplifying somewhat) that the problem
with the Balcerowicz Program was not what it did or the technocratic approach
adopted to do it, but rather what it left undone: the creation (and recreation) of
economic and social institutions which would be the actors in economic life under the
new conditions. Most importantly this was a question of reform of enterprises and
public administration. (It is these questions that we will examine in the next two
sections in an attempt to test our second and third hypotheses.) Additionally, we have
argued that while a participatory approach was not advisable in design and
implementation of the stabilization and liberalization package, it would have been
better for the long-term fate of the reform program if the reform team had done a better
job of explaining the reforms (the nature of the market economy and the rationale for
the reforms) to society and thus creating a broader group of “reform advocates” within
the society. However, with respect to the other various interest groups treated in
hypothesis 5, we also observe that one of the advantages of the technocratic approach
adopted in the case of the Balcerowicz reform package – due to the fact that it was
largely a matter of adjusting systemic parameters rather than creating institutions –
was the fact that while large groups were, at least in the very early transformation
period, “transformation losers”, the liberalization and stabilization reform did not lead
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to the creation of “early winner” groups who would have had an interest in blocking
further reforms. On the contrary, those groups that were made winners by the
Balcerowicz liberalization-stabilization package – e.g., importers – all had an interest
in staying the reform course.
With reference to our fourth hypothesis, we can state that – in spite of the important
role played by foreign advisers including Jeffrey Sachs and representatives of
international financial institutions – the Polish stabilization and liberalization reform
package was a Polish product. This fact constitutes a great success whose importance
cannot be overestimated, because part of the initial conditions and inherited baggage
of the past referred to in our formulation of the hypothesis was the post-Communist
countries’ shortage of trained professionals competent to understand the issues
involved and design and implement such a program (a shortage which was much more
severe – in some cases amounting to a complete lack of such persons – in many
countries of the former Soviet Union). 
Again with respect to our sixth hypothesis, concerning the external environment,
we have noted that the recession was deeper and longer than the reformers had
expected, and drew attention to the role of unforeseen external circumstances such as
the collapse of the CMEA and the Soviet Union in prolonging the recession. It should
also be noted that this period was not a favorable one in the world economy, with both
the United States and Japan moving into recession. Thus, external circumstances are
seen to have significant effects on the popularity and political prospects of reformers,
independently of the degree of success of their reform programs, which is sometimes
not appreciated until several years after their implementation.
An interesting observation unrelated to the issues dealt with in our hypotheses is
that a change in the ruling party is not necessary for reform reversals, which have
sometimes been initiated by the same groups earlier responsible for reform policies.
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In this report, we use the terms privatization and restructuring in a narrow sense.
Privatization means transfer of state-owned stock into private (non-state) hands (unlike
privatization in the broad sense; i.e., development of the private sector of economy  –
both through privatization of state-owned enterprises and spontaneous formation of de
novo private companies15). We limit restructuring to changes in organizational
structures, operations, interactions, and motivations within enterprises. We use the
OECD definition of corporate governance as the system by which business
corporations are directed and controlled. The corporate governance structure specifies
the distribution of rights and responsibilities among different participants in the
corporation, such as the board, managers, shareholders and other stakeholders, and
spells out the rules and procedures for making decisions on corporate affairs.
5.1. Privatization
Intellectual and ideological context. Choosing the model
Through almost the whole period of Communist rule in Poland, serious discussions
were held on improving the efficiency of Polish enterprise sector. Unlike most other
countries of the Soviet bloc, those discussions went far beyond ideas of how to improve
the central planning system. One of the most popular approaches was that of
participation of employees in the management of state-owned firms. Apart from purely
ideological justifications of such an approach (workers as co-owners of the state
property), it was believed that employee participation would boost enterprise
performance by overcoming labor alienation and by harmonizing interests of
employees with those of the firm and the whole national economy. Even if some of the
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5. Enterprise reform (privatization
and restructuring)
discussion participants had doubts as to whether state-owned enterprises with
employee participation were the most effective form of enterprise (especially compared
to privately owned companies), they believed that in the given circumstances, this was
the most radical and effective solution. 
In Communist times, there were two serious efforts to introduce employee
participation in Poland. In 1956, workers councils were set up in state-owned
enterprises, but their powers were severely limited by the unreformed centrally
planned system of distribution of production tasks among enterprises. In 1981, a
deeper reform of enterprise sector started, with employee self-management being part
of a new set of decentralized principles of state-owned enterprise operation, known as
“The Three S’s” (self-management, self-financing and self-dependence). Thus, when the
Communist regime collapsed in Poland, a strong self-management intellectual tradition
existed, and groups supporting this approach had arisen within enterprises and
academia and on the political arena. 
At the beginning of transformation, the attention of the first non-Communist
government was concentrated on the more obvious, and highly urgent, tasks of
macroeconomic stabilization and liberalization, subjects which were perhaps
somewhat less controversial than ownership transformation. Here, shock therapy
measures had been applied, while privatization and institutional changes were carried
out rather cautiously and gradually (in contrast to the mass privatization procedures
used later in, for example, the Russian Federation and the Czech Republic).
Maintaining a balanced budget, combating inflation and ensuring macroeconomic
equilibrium as well as introducing a greater degree of economic freedom has always
been included in a standard set of activities undertaken by many countries in the world
and were applied in Poland with a considerable degree of success (as discussed above,
in Section 4). Yet, with respect to radical institutional changes and large-scale
privatization, recourse to existing Western practices was impossible, since there was no
previous experience on this scale (the privatization of entire economies). 
At the same time, there was no consensus concerning the direction of privatization
processes among economic and political elites, in the government and between the
government and its foreign and domestic advisers. While agreeing with the main
rationale for large-scale ownership transformation (found in property rights theory,
which explained the inefficiency of the socialist enterprise sector on the basis of
incomplete property rights), the participants of the discussion had different views on at
least three important questions: 
– What type of owner (and more generally  –  what type of corporate control) is
the most efficient?
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– What other goals can be met by privatization?
– What should be done to make the privatization process itself as efficient as
possible?
A general debate on the privatization concept took place in late 1989 and 1990.
Three main concepts of privatization came up against each other, each providing a
separate answer to the aforementioned questions:
– a commercial concept of the sale of state-owned assets using classical
methods, including trade sales but most importantly public offerings (based
on the British experience);
– nonequivalent privatization based on employee ownership and the US
Employee Stock Ownership Program concept and backed by the Polish labor
self-management tradition;
– nonequivalent privatization through free distribution of assets among all
citizens, based on newly drafted privatization concepts (Błaszczyk, 1993;
Gilejko, 1995).
In its first economic program of October 1989, the government gave preference to the
first, “classical” concept of privatization, combined with rapid development of de novo
private sector which would absorb workforce from the shrinking state and ex-state sector.
In turn, the privatization law, passed July 13, 1990, tried to make use of all the three
privatization concepts in order to ensure the widest possible impact of privatization on
transformation economic, social and political transformation in Poland. Ideologically, it
reflected coexistence of different views on the scope and methods of ownership
transformation, and more generally – on the principles of the post-Communist
transformation as a whole. The privatization law represents a certain combination of two
main options: liberal conceptions patterned after solutions adopted in developed market
economy countries, and a participatory approach originating from the Polish labor self-
management movement and tending towards a kind of “Third Way” of development. It
should be noted that despite the fact that the authors of the privatization concept were
under strong pressure from the self-management movement to favor employee
ownership, our interviewees involved in decision-making at the beginning of transition
unanimously stressed that they (as well as the government as a whole) had virtually a free
hand in designing reforms, because interest groups strong enough to influence decisions
of the government and the parliament hadn’t yet formed in 1989-1990.
Goals and methods of privatization
During the whole analyzed period, no detailed description of the main goals of
privatization was prepared. Only a few of the goals were ever officially mentioned, and
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most of them had to be deduced from decisions made by the Parliament and
governmental agencies. 
The economic program of the first post-Communist government (the so-called
Balcerowicz Plan) addressed privatization issues in the context of the creation of
market institutions which had stood the test of time in Western economies. Following
that simple course of thought, the main privatization goal was of a systemic character:
to contribute to the change of the economic system through creation of private entities.
Within the framework of this goal a number of sub-goals existed, of which the most
important was the creation of well-functioning markets, including a securities market.
Apart from this purely systemic role, privatization was to solve the problem of
microeconomic inefficiency of state-owned enterprises; this would, in turn, contribute
to the rise in productivity of the whole enterprise sector.
Although never officially formulated, the third goal was of crucial importance: to
make the whole reform process smooth, stable and irreversible. Privatization was
expected to create not only incentives for economic development, but also to create
powerful pro-reform lobby of actors, involved in privatization process and using its
results. Such a lobby would exert strong pressure on decision-makers to continue pro-
market reforms. The assumption was that a critical mass must be achieved, when
liberal and market institutions and actors become stronger than the forces and
institutions of the Communist past.
The fourth goal was of a fiscal nature. The value of the state-owned stock
designated for privatization was large, therefore the potential privatization revenues of
the budget were also significant and able to contribute to reduction of the budget
deficit.
The fifth group of goals was related to the use of privatization for solving a wide set
of social problems. On the one hand, attempts were made to attain a kind of social
justice (via distribution of part of the privatized stock among the whole population and,
additionally, by creating preferences for certain groups who were felt to deserve such
entitlements). Additionally, attempts were made to use privatization to resolve the
social problems in concrete enterprises by imposing on the buyers certain obligations
concerning employment, wages, environmental protection, etc.
A set of hidden goals existed as well, when the government drew public attention
to one goal while the real, most important goals were not advertised because they were
less attractive to the broad public. In some cases we can describe this as an “honest”
hidden agenda (for example, stressing the social profits from privatization in order to
gain public support and unblock or speed up the privatization process – e.g., this
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included preferential treatment of insiders). Trying to build a strong coalition of pro-
reform forces, the government had to bear in mind that different coalition members
might have different motivations, so it seemed to be politically rational not to spell out
the goals. Moreover, given the multiplicity of objectives and the constraints, a detailed
description of the privatization goals would have been almost impossible.
In other cases, however, hidden goals were less “honest.” For example, they
appeared in the course of formation of entrenched interest groups which were
interested in privatization (or more often lack of privatization, e.g. in the sectors where
privatization would mean discontinuance of public financial support), or some specific
method of privatization of enterprises or whole branches, primarily in view of the gains
they expected to reap as a result. Members of these groups rather seldom occupied the
highest positions in the government or administration; they were influential mostly as
lobbyists or voters.
The problem is that at least some of the goals may be contradictory. For example,
pursuing the fiscal goals may jeopardize the goal of increasing of microeconomic
efficiency (the more an investor must pay to the budget, the less he may invest in a
company16). In addition, maximizing global revenues from privatization would require
a gradual approach (because glutting the market with privatization offers would reduce
the market prices of enterprises), while the tactical goal of reduction of the budget
deficit in a given year could lead to just such an attempt to maximize privatization
revenues in a given year, thus lowering the total revenues to be achieved from
privatization. Excessive attention to the social obligations of an investor may lead to
inadequate investments in the company (an excessively high wage bill reduces funds
available for investment). The goals related to “social justice” (e.g., “enterprises should
belong to their employees” or “enterprises should belong to the whole society”) may
contradict the need to find efficient owners for privatized enterprises.
It is quite obvious that contradictions between official and hidden goals can be
highly destructive for the privatization process, especially in the case of “dishonest”
goals. Their pursuit not only leads to slowdown and distortions in the privatization
process, but has severe political consequences related to the corruption of the state
apparatus, deceleration of the construction of institutions of the market economy, and
growing disappointment of population.
A set of goals on the enterprise level also existed. These were the group and
individual goals of the managers and employees of state-owned enterprises. Quite often
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such goals were not in line with the privatization policy conducted by the government.
This problem is of a special importance in Poland, where insiders have very substantial
impact on privatization of “their” enterprises. At this level, too, we observe openly
proclaimed and hidden goals, the latter often connected with enfranchisement of
certain enterprise actors (primarily managers).
Another important feature of Polish privatization (and the whole enterprise sector
reform) is its gradualist, highly consensual character. Its authors were aware of a trade-
off between the speed and quality of transformation processes. They believed that lower
speed resulting from careful preparation of privatization deals (both in the technical
and social dimensions) is much more important than massive and rapid formal change
of owners, because the reformed market environment would exert strong pressure on
state-owned enterprises and force them to adapt and restructure, thus making their
privatization less urgent, although still necessary. The gradual character of Polish
privatization also reflected a choice made in the discussion of what should come first:
privatization (which would create demand for further reforms)17 or regulation and
institutional constraints (in order to create a framework for actors’ behavior and
prevent tunneling)18. The gradualism reflected a choice in favor of the latter solution.
The main features of Polish privatization (multiplicity of goals and its low-pace
consensual character) were reflected in the privatization law, which envisaged a wide
range of possible methods and paths of ownership transformation: sale both to strategic
investors and via the stock market, management-employee buyouts and even a unique
kind of mass privatization that had been designed not only to transfer a significant
(albeit limited in comparison with other post-Communist countries) part of the state’s
sectors assets to Polish citizens, but also to create a mechanism for actively
restructuring the companies participating in mass privatization. All methods and paths
of privatization are equivalent (buyers pay the market price or a price based on
valuation), except the NIF program, where certificates of ownership were distributed
among the population for a nominal fee.
To govern the privatization processes, a brand new special structure within public
administration had do be set up. The Ministry of Privatization (reconstituted in 1996 as
the Ministry of the State Treasury) had to perform functions which had not existed
before, which for the reformers meant that it had to be organized in a way differing
significantly from the established culture of public administration in Poland. Moreover,
its functions, as originally conceived, were limited in time (meaning that it was to be
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liquidated after privatization ended). Thus the ministry had to create its patterns of
behavior, internal structure etc. in a new and uncertain environment, and be very task-
oriented (not to form another interest group interested in perpetuation of the transition
period or, if the end of transition becomes inevitable, adopt “end-game” behavior trying
to convert its authority into another, more liquid form). This was, moreover, the
problem of all new agencies created to serve the process of post-Communist
transformation.
Creation of conditions for private sector development
Liberalization and deregulation measures intended to facilitate new entries were
started by the last Communist government under Prime Minister Mieczysław Rakowski,
which adopted the Law on Economic Activity (December 1988). Limited liberalization
of foreign trade and FDI was also introduced at this time. But the real breakthrough was
made by the first two post-Communist governments (Mazowiecki’s and Bielecki’s),
which made development of the private sector (privatization in a “broad sense”) a
cornerstone of economic policy, privatization of state-owned enterprises being only a
part of this larger process. These governments implemented a wide range of measures
aimed at radical facilitation of new entries and liquidation of obstacles for market
competition (including opening to competition of foreign entities), in particular:
– creation of uniform tax policy for all ownership sectors (although SOEs for
some time were subject to two additional taxes – a kind of a capital tax and a
tax on excessive wage increases);
– acceptance of a new anti-monopoly legislation, deconcentration of some sectors
of industry (see section 5.2.1 below);
– liquidation of all federations of cooperatives;
– introduction of a customs law corresponding to European Community
standards;
– abolition of all remaining forms of trade not based on free market principles;
– price liberalization;
– ending of traditional central planning, granting greater independence and
responsibility to state-owned enterprises;
– creation of a securities market;
– acceptation of the new Foreign Investment Law eliminating most licensing
requirements and allowing the free repatriation of profit and invested capital;
– introduction of current account convertibility of the Polish currency
(Dąbrowski, 1995).
63
UNDERSTANDING REFORM: THE CASE OF POLAND
CASE Reports No. 59
Implementation of such a wide range of very radical measures (as well as other
components of stabilization, liberalization and institutional reform) was inevitably in
conflict with many existing interests. It was possible only in the “extraordinary”
situation of the early years of reforms, when the government enjoyed an exceptional
“credibility credit” from the society that supported the changes not being aware of their
real meaning and burden, as well as the political support (so-called “umbrella”) of
“Solidarity” trade union. Old interest groups were in a sense taken by surprise and
scattered, and new interest groups were only forming and too weak to exert strong
pressure on the reformers’ team. This created a window of opportunity for
implementing difficult reforms in the forceful and credible fashion. This period is
sometimes referred to as period of “extraordinary politics” (Balcerowicz 1995).
Quantitative effects of privatization
The most striking, and arguably most important quantitative result of the process of
privatization of the Polish economy has been the creation of nearly 200,000 new private
companies (and about 2.5 million private one-person and family businesses) since 1989,
which make up more than 97% of all registered firms, employ 70% of the work force and
are responsible for 75% of GDP (Central Statistical Office, 2003; EBRD, 2003).
In Poland, the so-called small privatization, affecting the retail, catering and
service sectors, was conducted very rapidly: by the end of 1992, 97% of all units in these
sectors had been privatized. This was a decentralized, “grassroots” process led by
thousands of local authorities, virtually without any intervention from the central
government.
Decentralization of initiation of privatization deals in enterprise sector and the
high role of insiders in this process, together with possibility of establishing
management-employee ownership, acted as a catalyst of privatization of SOEs. During
the first years, MEBOs and other forms of decentralized, “participatory” privatization
greatly outnumbered centralized, government-led sales of enterprises. At the same
time, the overall pace of privatization of the enterprise sector was much slower than
had been anticipated. Besides, since the mid-1990s we have witnessed a substantial
slowdown of the privatization process, which occurred due to two main reasons: the
stock of “easy to privatize” enterprises was rapidly depleted, and political pressure for
privatization slowdown increased (Figure 5.1).
The speed of ownership transformation depended mainly on the industry, size,
organizational structure and profitability of an enterprise. The privatization of small
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in manufacturing, trade and construction was
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usually accomplished relatively quickly (as technically and politically less complicated
– more than half of them were bought by managers and employees). The other pole was
represented by the largest enterprises, especially from infrastructural sectors, mining
and metallurgy. Obstacles of a political nature started to appear as well (i.e., powerful
interest groups which defended the status quo and created pressure on the government
to slow down privatization; this will be discussed further below). Apart form “re-
consolidating” sectoral programs described in the next section, the 1993 Law on the
Ownership Transformation of Certain SOEs of Special Importance for the National
Economy was passed, which in fact excluded a large number of enterprises from the
privatization process. Additionally, the 1996 Privatization Law in practice lifted the
obligation to privatize commercialized state-owned enterprises. As a result, by 2003,
privatization was completed only in the case of 66% of state-owned enterprises
(Nawrot, 2003), and state-controlled firms still produce about 25% of the GDP (Central
Statistical Office, 2003). 
As a result, the characteristic feature of Polish privatization is quite a large number
of cases of “unfinished privatization” in the form of more than 500 predominantly large
companies that were only commercialized, but never privatized (the so-called sole-
shareholder company of the Treasury, Polish acronym: JSSP), and about 100
companies where the Treasury has stakes of more than 50% (Nawrot, 2003). Moreover,
in the National Registry of Business Entities (REGON) there are still more than 1700
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Source: Ministry of the Treasury (2004).
Figure 5.1. Dynamics of privatization (number of enterprises by years, 1990-2003)
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state-owned enterprises19 (out of the total number of 8453 SOEs at the beginning of
transition) (Central Statistical Office 1991, 2004).
5.2. Enterprise restructuring
The need for a policy on an enterprise restructuring
The gradualist privatization model led to the necessity of a special approach towards
enterprise restructuring. In fast models, deep restructuring is expected to happen after
privatization and is the new owners’ responsibility (except some superficial
restructuring made in order to speed up privatization process, such as splitting up of
enterprises etc.). In the gradualist model of ownership transformation adopted in
Poland, where deep restructuring is often postponed, the problem of government-led
restructuring arises. There were two main tasks of such restructuring efforts:
– to prepare large enterprises that were still under state control for privatization
by increasing their value and making them more attractive for potential
investors;
– to make them viable and able to adapt to rapid changes in their environment
for the period when they were still state-controlled.
The first task was realized through various methods, including stripping the
enterprises of their social assets (such as kindergartens, holiday homes, medical
services, sport centers etc.), as well as through recapitalization, downsizing, etc.
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a The share of the Treasury is less than 50%. Without the NIF program.
Source: Central Statistical Office (2003), Ministry of the Treasury (2003, 2004).
Table 5.1. Selected data on privatization of state-owned enterprises
Performance (2002)
Turnover profitability rateMethods of privatization
Number of
companies
(end 2003)
Total
employment,
thousands
(end 2002)
Cost level
indicator gross net
“Indirect” privatization: 1539
JSSP 541 352.6 101.9 -1.8 -2.4
completed casesa 277 242.3 97.9 2.1 0.5
- with participation of foreign investors 90 81.5 97.0 3.0 1.7
companies included in NIF Program 512 124.9 101.8 -1.7 -2.4
Debt conversion 17 1.9 118.9 -18.9 -18.9
“Direct” privatization: 2062
MEBO 1357 151.2 98.0 2.0 0.9
in-kind contribution 232 44.1 99.7 0.3 -0.3
other forms of “direct” privatization 508 2.5 103.3 -3.3 -3.5
Liquidation (completed cases) 932
TOTAL 4550 982.8 99.9 0.1 -0.9
At the same time, at the beginning of transition in Poland, the need for the
implementation of the second task was not fully appreciated. A large-scale
demonopolization and deconcentration of Polish economy have been carried out in the
form of breakup of state-owned enterprises in a number of industries (meat, sugar,
grain, cement, coal, energy, energy generating machine, mining, internal trade,
construction, commodity transport, public utilities and other), and the common
opinion was that the emerging market would force changes in state-owned enterprises’
behavior and necessary restructuring. In fact, only one instrument of external pressure
was used at that time: the popiwek (introduced in the 1980s and lifted in 1995), whose
goal, as discussed in Section 3, was to decrease the inflationary pressure of wages in
the state-owned sector. However, in 1990 and especially 1991, negative factors in SOE
operations became apparent: there was a sharp decline in production, increase in
enterprises’ debts and tax and wage arrears.
Since then, many restructuring programs have been adopted, with only a few being
successful. Here, we discuss some of most important programs. We start with the
relatively successful enterprise and bank restructuring program.
The Enterprise and Bank Restructuring Program
The government became aware of the inadequacy of its laissez-faire approach
towards these processes only when the steadily growing bad debts of the state-owned
sector towards the banks began to seriously threaten the stability of Polish banking
system, after foreign experts alarmed the government about the rapidly growing bad
loan portfolios of a number of state-owned commercial banks in 1991. In 1992-1993 a
group of enterprises (mostly state-owned industrial enterprises and housing
cooperatives) representing one tenth of the enterprise sector (in terms of sales) had
accumulated enormous debts to banks, the government and other enterprises. (It is also
worth noting, however, that the remaining 90% of the enterprise sector was almost
debt-free.) By mid-1991 bad debts were found to represent a weighted average of 42%
of the credit portfolios of the nine commercial banks hived off of the NBP in 1988
(Gomułka, 1993).
Experts from the World Bank recommended the implementation of a standard
procedure for cleaning up banks’ bad loan portfolios, applied in Spain and some
countries of Latin America, which envisaged first transferring bad debts from banks’
portfolios to a specially created restructuring agency responsible for work-outs (a so-
called “bank hospital”), and then recapitalizing the banks. 
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However, the Polish government (Finance Ministry officials) did not believe in the
efficacy of this procedure, because, in Polish conditions, it would not address the cause
of the problem, which lay primarily in the lack of experience and expertise of the banks
in assessing credit risks and of enterprises in proper governance in the market
environment. Nor did they believe in the efficient functioning of a centralized,
government-run “bank hospital” and its ability to resist political pressure. The idea was
that the restructuring of banks with bad loans portfolios and indebted enterprises should
force a change in the way they operate: banks should learn risk assessment and
management by dealing with the bad debt problem themselves, and the management of
enterprises would be improved and capable of coping with challenges of the market.
Thus, contrary to the suggestions of foreign experts, the Polish government applied a
participatory approach that envisaged decentralized learning of the main actors involved.
Under the 1993 Law on Financial Restructuring of Enterprises and Banks, each
participating state-owned bank created a special department to manage its bad loan
portfolio, and could use a number of methods for restructuring that portfolio, including
debt-to-equity swaps and the innovative bank conciliation procedure, under which
banks holding at least 50% of the total claims against a given debtor had to reach an
agreement on debt restructuring with that debtor enterprise. After the initial
assessment of the costs (e.g., in terms of written-off debt), but prior to carrying out the
restructuring operations, the banks were subject to a one-off recapitalization. After
having cleaned up their portfolios, banks were to be privatized.
The process of preparing the law and its implementation did not encounter any
significant political resistance, because of appropriate PR activity (in fact, the main
goal of the law was to prevent a banking sector crisis, but in order to make the whole
process politically palatable, the need to help indebted enterprises was stressed) and
the fact that it reconciled the interests of all the main actors involved: policy makers,
bank management, enterprise management and employee organizations. The program
was supported by international and foreign funding, primarily from the EU Phare
program and the British Know-How Fund.
The success list on the side of enterprises was rather short. The program was
indeed successful in selecting and keeping alive the best state-owned enterprises while
the worst were pushed towards exit. But there was no significant overall improvement
in enterprises’ performance, the main impact of conciliation simply being a “breathing
room” for them (Gray and Holle, 1996). Banks proved to be rather weak in promoting
the needed restructuring and/or privatization of enterprises (for example, they seldom
took advantage of the opportunity, provided for in the law, to take over enterprises
through debt-equity swaps).
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But the main goal of the program was achieved: a banking crisis was prevented and
today the Polish bank system is very sound and, unlike in most other post-Communist
countries, in Poland there were no banking or financial crises during the whole
transition period. Bank solvency was restored, banks changed their behavior from
uncritical funding of enterprise losses to making decisions on the basis of profitability
concerns. 
Enterprise restructuring in other sectors
Trying to overcome negative tendencies in the state-owned sector, in 1992-1993 the
government started to prepare and implement sectoral restructuring programs
involving the re-consolidation of the previously deconcentrated sectors. At the first
stage of this process, the main goal of such re-consolidation was prevention of the
collapse of those sectors of economy where state-owned enterprises still prevailed,
increasing their competitiveness and thereby making possible their future
privatization. It was believed that re-consolidation would lead to:
– cost reduction due to economies of scale;
– optimization of investments;
– optimization of production processes;
– improved competitiveness with foreign companies due to increase in companies’
scale;
– increase in the value of the companies, which would lead to higher revenues
from their privatization.
In fact, since then almost all restructuring programs have envisaged a greater or
lesser degree of consolidation of the remaining state-owned enterprises. In 1993-2003,
big state-controlled companies and/or holding structures were created in coal mining,
sugar, petrol, ferrous metallurgy, and banking. At the same time, some sectors were not
even deconcentrated, or such a deconcentration had only formal character (for
example, in railway transport and telecommunications  –  in the latter case, the
national telecom company remained a monopolist even after privatization). In some
sectors, restructuring through re-consolidation indeed gave some positive effects (for
example in downsizing both in terms of production and employment, raise in labor
productivity etc.), but it is hard to tell whether these improvements wouldn’t have been
more widespread and deep without re-consolidation. Certainly this policy helped to
keep alive a lot of firms that otherwise would have gone bankrupt, but this in fact
extended the death throes of the inefficient state-owned sector and forced the
government to keep subsidizing these firms in more or less open form (e.g., through
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recapitalization, write-off of tax arrears, etc.). Another cause for slow restructuring at
lest of some these sectors (e.g., coal mining, railways) was its highly negotiated,
participatory character, allowing the interest groups threatened by restructuring to
exert influence on its speed. Nevertheless, our interviewee who had studied the
problems of privatization and enterprise restructuring since the very beginning of
transition has strong doubts whether in the given political circumstances a more
technocratic approach would have been more efficient.
But not only the “technical” inefficiency of this kind of restructuring presented a
threat to the reforms. As it turned out, the social and political dimension of
concentration of the state-controlled sector was much more dangerous. This policy
led to the creation or consolidation of powerful interest groups both within sectors
(employees, managers, trade unions, often constituting powerful coalitions placing
demands on the government) and among the political elites of the country.
Emergence of these interest groups led to strong political bargaining with the
government, which in many cases stopped both real restructuring of state-owned
enterprises and their subsequent privatization. Since the establishment of these
entrenched groups, whose positions were largely consolidated by the mid-1990s,
almost all sectoral restructuring programs of the government reflected more the
interests of those groups than the goal of genuine restructuring. This effect has been
intensified by the mentality of the left-wing ruling coalitions (which proved to be
more prone to tighten state control over the economy than right-wing coalitions  –
not only in enterprise restructuring, but also in other spheres of economic policy),
originating perhaps not so much from leftist ideology as from the habits inherited
from the central planning era (many left-wing politicians were already active in
Communist party and state administration in the 1980s). 
5.3. Building corporate governance mechanisms
Intellectual background and political context
At the microeconomic level, one of the main tasks of both privatization and
enterprise restructuring was the building of efficient corporate governance
mechanisms that would help to overcome the governance problems which in
Communist times were one of the main obstacles to raising the efficiency and
productivity of the enterprise sector. 
The choice of the right corporate governance model was not an easy task, however. 
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First, there was a question what corporate governance model would be the best for
the Polish enterprise sector. In developed market economies, two main models existed
(Anglo-Saxon and Continental) that reflected different philosophies of corporate
governance, especially in the field of corporate control mechanisms and company
mission.
Pragmatically speaking, the Continental model was more suitable for Poland (as
well as other post-Communist countries) for a number of reasons:
(1) The influence of external control (in the form of commodity, financial, take-over and
other markets) did not exist or was not sufficiently effective. In such conditions, the
efficient functioning of internal supervision was of fundamental importance.
(2) The investment potential of the Polish population was weak, therefore the main
sources of capital had to be looked for elsewhere. The Continental model assumed
the significant role of a strategic investor, in Polish circumstances  –  most likely
foreign (and, later, also domestic industrial and institutional).
(3) Both the managerial skills and technical assets of Polish enterprises were archaic
and not adapted to the new challenges of the emerging market environment.
Strategic investors, especially foreign ones, were able to bring to a company not only
capital, but also a new culture of management, of company behavior towards its
environment, new technology etc.
Second, the corporate governance model was expected not only to meet
enterprises’ needs (i.e., their efficient operation), but also serve the transition in Poland
in general, being a part of the new political, social and economic model. Therefore, the
choice of a model depended on social and political considerations as well. Here, the
choice between Anglo-Saxon and Continental model was not so obvious, because the
Anglo-Saxon idea of shareholder value suited the ideas of mass enfranchisement of
population. On the other hand, the Continental model was of a more participatory
character, which suited the advocates of employee self-management and participation.
Third, unlike green-field companies, privatized enterprises did not emerge out of the
blue. They represent a continuation (in economic, organizational, social and other ways)
of the former SOE. The “legacy” of SOEs has several aspects, including the following:
– the state-owned enterprise had its own organizational structure, with each
body having its own competencies to which all actors had become
accustomed;
– in most state-owned enterprises, stable structures of power and influence had
been established, and many insider actors were afraid of losing them after
privatization;
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– the mentality and behavior of the main insider actors were to a great extent
determined by their previous experience in the state-owned enterprise.
Here, a real threat was that entrenched insiders would resist any attempt to change
the internal status quo. Therefore, there was a popular view that strong owner control
must be imposed, while taking insiders’ concerns into account. Under such
circumstances, the Continental model seemed to be a good solution (Jarosz,
Kozarzewski, 2002; Kozarzewski, 2003).
The legal background
So, the Continental model of corporate governance was chosen, with slight
inconsistencies and alterations caused by ideological and political considerations, as
well as pressure exerted by the main actors on the Polish corporate governance scene.
It is worth noting, that in most cases Polish legislation does not take the concerns
of stakeholders into account in corporate governance structures. For example, there is
no general requirement to include the representatives of stakeholders (e.g., employees)
on the supervisory board (although such a requirement exists in JSSPs). The peculiarity
of the Polish legal system is that the main vehicle for representation of stakeholder
interests in Poland is privatization legislation, rather than regulations affecting the
enterprise sector in general. Thus, there are fundamental differences in the corporate
governance regime depending on whether an enterprise originated in the state sector
or the de novo private sector – a situation which is, to our knowledge, not found in any
other European country.
The Polish legal background for corporate governance can be assessed as good,
with strong disclosure and transparency requirements (especially for publicly listed
companies) – but not flawless. First, it is not instructive enough, too often giving
general ideas and principles rather than concrete solutions, which is insufficient in the
country with no previous experience in market economy behavior. Second, the system
of rights and safeguards that regulates corporate governance within companies is
imperfect. It makes possible the abuse of minority interests, and recently we have seen
cases of abuses of the majority by a minority representing powerful industrial interests.
In many cases, there are no efficient safeguards against opportunistic behavior of
managers. Third, legal acts sometimes contradict each other and overlap; the most
important such cases include the Company Code, the Act on Public Securities Trading,
and the Act on Commercialization and Privatization of State-owned Enterprises
(Tamowicz, Dzierżanowski, 2002; Kozarzewski, 2003).
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5.4. Effects of enterprise sector reform
Corporate governance
It should be noted that the patterns of corporate governance emerging in Polish
companies depend on a number of factors, and not on corporate law alone. Other
factors include: the privatization law and practice; the law on the securities market and
its development in practice; the pace, scope, and effects of restructuring programs; the
process of re-configuration of enterprise goals and main actors’ interests in the course
of transition, and the type of dominant owner.
The heterogeneous character of Polish privatization, peculiarities of regulation and
real processes of enterprise privatization and restructuring resulted in the emergence
of heterogeneous patterns of corporate governance in privatized enterprises, although
all of them formally stay within the Continental model. Among those patterns, at least
three deserve special attention. 
The first pattern is represented by the largest companies which went through
“indirect” privatization and have concentrated ownership structures, often dominated
by foreign investors. In the sector of former SOEs, they are unquestionable leaders in
post-privatization restructuring and creation of highly efficient corporate governance
structures and behavior. 
The ownership structure of this group of companies is highly concentrated (and the
concentration level is still growing), and insiders’ participation is very limited, unlike
in privatized SMEs and in spite of the pro-insider provisions of Polish privatization law
(half-price and free shares for employees in the case of indirect privatization).
In almost all companies we have studied in a separate project on corporate
governance (Kozarzewski, 2002), deep changes in corporate governance structures
have been introduced, and the “legacy” of the state-owned past has already been
overcome. Thus, the processes of post-communist corporate governance
transformation are complete. However, changes in corporate control mechanisms
appear to be conditional on the characteristics of the controlling shareholder(s). The
companies with the highest levels of ownership concentration, especially those
dominated by foreign investors, have more coherent corporate governance structures.
In the companies with the lowest levels of ownership concentration, the shareholders’
majority is often rather formal and does not ensure full real control over the company.
Within the pattern in question, companies with foreign investor domination
deserve special attention. Corporate governance structures in most of these companies
are very transparent with clear division of powers among the executive board,
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supervisory board, and general assembly of shareholders. At the same time, the foreign
investor keeps tight and efficient control over the firm. An important feature of
corporate governance policy in foreign dominated companies is the introduction of
incentives for insiders (primarily managers), in the form of small blocks of shares
and/or seats on the supervisory board. 
The second pattern is found in companies privatized by management-employee
buyouts (MEBO). Most of them used the leasing path of direct privatization, although
a significant number of such companies emerged as a result of direct sale and even
“indirect” privatization. There were two main trends of ownership transformation:
towards concentration of shares and toward their “outsiderization.” These processes
had varying intensity in different groups of companies, and three patterns of ownership
structure have emerged:
– management-employee pattern (large blocks of shares in the hands of
managers, the rest dispersed among non-managerial employees);
– dispersed insider ownership;
– ownership concentrated in the hands of an outside investor.
The most important factor that influenced the direction and dynamics of ownership
changes was the economic performance of the company, which favors concentration and
“outsiderization” of ownership when very poor or very good. In the former case, this can
be seen as a trade-off between the power of insiders and the firm’s chances for continued
existence. In the latter case, it reflects the opportunity of insiders to reap significant gains
by selling their shares to outside investors. By the end of the 1990s, the post-privatization
processes of property redistribution have been completed in most MEBO companies, and
now only minor changes can be seen (Kozarzewski, Woodward, 2003). 
Compared with enterprises that have been privatized through indirect methods,
corporate governance structures in MEBO companies seem to be to a great extent
dysfunctional. A problematic division of powers and functions can be seen in many
companies, which is caused by unclear principal-agent relations.
Besides, MEBO companies are characterized by a very high inertia of the authority
and influence structures which emerged already during the Communist period.
Reproduction of the managerial elites in these companies (especially with respect to
SOE directors and the executive boards of the privatized companies) as a rule takes the
form of internal “direct reproduction” (Wasilewski, Wnuk-Lipinski, 1995); i.e., one that
does not entail shifts of individuals within the hierarchy of authority.
As to the ideological underpinnings of this path of privatization, it turned out that
claims regarding workers’ aspirations for employee participation had been
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exaggerated. As a rule, they did not express a desire to participate in management of
their firms, and shares with no dividends were as a rule of no use for them
(Kozarzewski, 1999). The main motivation for workers to retain shares was the fear of
unwelcome changes that an external investor might cause (lay-offs, worsening labor
conditions, etc). The popular idea of capitalism based on employee ownership
collapsed, but this collapse gave room for the development of corporate governance
mechanisms based on clearly defined property rights and a strict distinction between
ownership, supervisory and managerial functions.
The third pattern is represented by the JSSPs, companies wholly owned by the
state. Initially, JSSPs were intended to be a transition entity between the SOE and a
private company (with this stage lasting no longer than two years). However, in
practice, for every third enterprise which entered “indirect” privatization, ownership
transformation stopped at this stage indefinitely. At the beginning, the main cause for
this delay were problems with entering the next stage of privatization: technical
difficulties related to restructuring and preparing a privatization deal, lack of
appropriate buyers, etc. Later on, however, strong lobbies emerged which were
interested in keeping enterprises in this intermediate stage. At the enterprise and
branch levels, these included trade unions and other organized groups of employees
who were not interested in privatization because it would lead to deep restructuring
followed by shutdowns of loss-making enterprises, lay-offs, and liquidation of branch
privileges. A separate category of insiders not interested in future privatization
consisted of the Treasury representatives on the supervisory boards. For them,
privatization meant the loss of their positions. Simultaneously, after a significant
slowdown of the entire reform process in Poland beginning in 1992, and increase in
clientelist behavior of the political elite, JSSPs began to be regarded as a significant
asset in the hands of politicians and governmental bureaucracy. The Ministry of
Ownership Transformation (later renamed the Ministry of the State Treasury) proved
to be to a large extent incapable of staying within the boundaries of a task-oriented
organization set up for organizing the process of transition. It  suffered a growing
conflict between its owner’s and seller’s functions: the fewer assets under control of the
ministry, the less its political weight. This attitude was strengthened by winning
political parties, which started to treat state assets as spoils that belong to the victors.
One of the most attractive parts of this “loot” were the seats on the supervisory boards
of the JSSPs, and for a long period of time the Ministry used them as an instrument of
preserving its political importance and stability regardless of the changes of
governments (Błaszczyk et al., 2001; Jarosz, 2001). Thus, the Ministry became one of
the interest groups working to slow down the reforms.
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Although JSSPs are regarded as a highly valuable asset in political struggles, at the
enterprise level the role of the Treasury Ministry as an owner is in most cases extremely
weak: the real priority is to keep this property and extract material gains from this
possession, and not to manage it in a microeconomically efficient way. It is therefore
not surprising that in terms of corporate governance and enterprise performance
JSSPs have become the most dysfunctional group of companies included in the
privatization process. Most JSSPs were for a long period of time left in an intermediate
state, being neither a “regular” SOE nor a private company, without any concrete
prospects or priorities for further ownership transformation, restructuring, etc.
Therefore, in practice, existing corporate governance structures are characterized by a
high degree of influence of managers and trade unions and the very weak role of the
representatives of the Treasury. Additionally, in many JSSPs the spheres of influence of
the main actors have not stabilized, which gives ground for perpetual conflicts
(Kozarzewski, 2003a).
The state is not the only institutional actor on the corporate scene whose
ineffectiveness in its corporate governance role has disappointed the hopes and
expectations of the reformers. The role of other institutional actors, such as banks,
insurance companies, pension funds and investment funds is rather sub-optimal,
although their activity (or lack of thereof) is not so dangerous for the outcome of
enterprise sector reform as that of the agencies of the state. The weak role of these non-
state institutional actors has many causes, including lack of experience and proper
governance, conflicts of interests, insufficient motivations to pursue the goals
envisaged for these actors by legislators, etc. 
However, perhaps the most important reason is the lack of proper infrastructure,
including most importantly the weakness and shallowness of the capital market. The
organized segment of the market represented by the Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE)
does not properly perform two basic functions of a stock exchange: valuation and a
source of capital for private sector. Ironically, the Treasury is the largest beneficiary of
capital inflow through the WSE: it was established mainly to serve initial public
offerings in the course of indirect privatization. The dominance of privatized
enterprises (61% companies listed are former SOEs) is a barrier for further
development of the WSE, because the main task of indirect privatization is to find
strategic investors for SOEs, and many such investors are not interested in keeping the
companies public (Tamowicz, Dzierżanowski, 2002) because of various reasons, among
others the less stringent prudent disclosure regulations for non-listed companies.
Moreover, the declining pace of privatization contributes to a further fall on the supply
side. The situation is additionally complicated by the entry of new players (e.g., pension
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funds) on the market, which produces additional demand. The WSE has never obtained
a proper balance on the demand and supply sides. During the first years of its existence,
the supply of shares of the largest privatized companies was huge in comparison with
demand. Now, the situation is reversed: the stagnant market has not expanded rapidly
enough to satisfy the needs of institutional investors. As a result, the WSE is a very
small market with a contracting tendency: the total number of companies listed is
falling (from 230 at the end of 2001 to 203 by the end of 2003)20.
In recent years, attempts have been made to strengthen corporate governance by
elaborating and introducing best practices of corporate governance. The main idea
behind this approach was that because legal regulations themselves are incapable of
dealing with all the problems of corporate governance, a set of principles should be
prepared which would serve both as instructions on how to behave correctly and as a
form of moral pressure on companies to introduce these principles. In 2002, the
Warsaw Stock Exchange adopted a Best Practices Code for listed companies, which
presented both the general ideas and concrete solutions aimed at improving corporate
governance in companies. Although this document is indeed rather a kind of moral
obligation imposed on companies than a strict regulation (because there are no
effective sanctions for not introducing those measures into companies’ charters and
everyday behavior), almost all companies declared that they were going to comply with
it. Nevertheless, none has declared compliance to every provision of the Code so far. It
is still too early to assess the impact of the Code on the governance of companies.
Changes in enterprise behavior and performance
There were at least two distinct phases, or periods, of changes in enterprises
behavior and performance. 
The main feature of the first period, which started in 1990 and ended in the mid-
1990s, was adjustment to the emerging market environment, first of all hardening
budget constraints and increasing competition. In that period, all types of enterprises
showed many similarities in their behavior. Privatization, not to mention its specific
methods and paths, seemed to have little influence on the adjustment patterns of
enterprises. There where three stages of this adjustment (Błaszczyk and Woodward,
1999; Mączyńska, 2001):
The first stage (1990-1991) was a period of severe crisis caused by external shocks
linked with the systemic change. While in 1990 many enterprises could still allow
themselves a “wait and see approach” because of accumulated financial and other
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reserves, 1991 was a year of sharp decline. At this time enterprises made intensive
efforts to find short-term survival strategies, mostly by employment cuts, sale of non-
productive assets etc., as well as by attempts to find new markets for their goods.
Production and sales, as well as other economic indicators, fell sharply. The real
indebtedness of enterprises was growing.
The  second stage of adjustment was in the years 1992-1993, when enterprises tried
to halt the decreasing trend of production and sales. In this stage, they introduced new
sales strategies. The first sign of recovery was the rise of labor productivity in 1992,
accompanied by a production increase, but the profitability indicators of enterprises
were still decreasing and investment stagnating. 1993 was the first year when the
financial performance of enterprises recovered and investment rose (although net
profitability was still negative).
The third stage of adjustment, starting in 1994, was characterized by steady
production growth, improvement of profitability, rising net profitability and investment
spending.
By the mid-1990s, adjustment processes in most enterprises were completed,
which marked the beginning of the second period. Since then, a gradual differentiation
between the restructuring patterns of various groups of enterprises has become more
and more visible. In turn, those emerging patterns began to differentiate changes in
enterprises’ performance. One of the most important vehicles of changes in enterprises
were changes (or lack of thereof) in their ownership structure, although the problem of
exogeneity vs. endogeneity of ownership structure vis-à-vis companies’ performance is
still not resolved. Privatization was characterized by a very strong selection bias,
especially in the case of management-employee buyouts and completed cases of
indirect (capital) privatization (these were generally the best-performing SOEs), but
there is strong evidence that ownership matters (although it is rather the type of
dominant owner than the level of concentration that is important).
Three types of enterprises (differentiated with respect to ownership) are of special
interest in Poland.
Privatized enterprises with dominant foreign investors. Here we observe the deepest
strategic restructuring, involving large investments and innovative technological
changes, which leads to the high economic performance of such companies.
Enterprises privatized to managers and employees. Most of these were viable
profitable small and medium-size enterprises at the beginning of privatization, many of
them already having their niches on the emerging market. This situation made
immediate restructuring measures less urgent, so many companies limited their efforts
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to shallow and simple restructuring measures. A real motivation for deep restructuring
appeared only when there was a real threat to the company’s further existence. During
the better part of the 1990s, this led to a gradually falling (albeit still favorable) trend
in MEBO companies’ economic indices, in contrast to the rising trend in companies
privatized through sales to strategic (especially foreign) investors. By the end of the
decade, a large number of MEBO companies seemed to realize that lack of
restructuring measures might jeopardize their future, and tried to change their
behavior, i.e., to start investment programs and deep technical restructuring.
Enterprises in practice exempt from privatization for some social, political or lobbyist
reasons. This group consists primarily of JSSPs and state-owned enterprises in
“sensitive” sectors such as infrastructure, mining etc. This group of companies
demonstrates the worst economic performance and a lack of deep and efficient
restructuring. The differences between these companies and privatized firms are
becoming more and more striking, the former showing not only worse economic
indices, but also no will or capabilities to perform deep restructuring, because of the
lack of incentives to change their rent-seeking behavior. Nevertheless, some managers
of such companies are longing for privatization (on their terms, i.e. that would preserve
their power) because they expect higher gains if their companies would be freed from
the government’s intervention.
5.5. Assessment
The processes of privatization and enterprise restructuring are marked by both
successes and failures. The most spectacular success is privatization in the “broad
sense” which boosted the growth of new private businesses and the share of the
private sector in the national economy. Privatization in the “narrow sense” (ownership
transformation of state-owned enterprises) was only a partial success, both in terms
of quantity and quality. Some methods of privatization proved to be more
“permeable,” easier to implement for a number of social, political and technical
reasons than the others; thus, the progress of privatization was very uneven across
sectors, and some of them (infrastructure, extractive industries and some others)
remain predominantly state-owned. There were two reasons for this situation: the
highly gradualist, consensual character of Polish privatization procedures and the
emergence of interest groups not interested in privatization of remaining state-
controlled companies.
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The outcome of enterprise restructuring processes is even more ambiguous. It
should be noted that two totally different types of restructuring exist in Poland. The first
one is led by new owners of privatized companies, and the success of such
restructuring to a great extent depends on the type of owner (restructuring efforts led
by foreign investors being among most successful). Adoption of the Continental model
of corporate governance also contributed significantly to successes of post-privatization
restructuring of enterprises. On the other hand, there are restructuring programs led
by the government which apply to the sectors that are still under state control. During
the whole period of post-Communist transformation, only one such program can be
regarded as a success, although not all of its declared goals have been met (Enterprise
and Bank Restructuring Program). Restructuring efforts of the government were
effectively blocked by newly emerging powerful interest groups of “early winners”
supported by employees of the state-owned sector; moreover, quite often restructuring
programs themselves contributed to consolidation of these groups.
The analysis of the enterprise sector reform supports most of our initial hypotheses,
and additionally allows us to refine some of them.
In particular, it corroborates our hypothesis #1: enterprise sector reforms require
a highly participatory approach, because their success depends not only on efficient
construction of new institutions, but also on ability to make the main actors behave in
post-reform environment in line with the goals of the reforms. On the other hand,
technical aspects of reforms must not be neglected, otherwise even highly relevant set
of actors involved will not be able to ensure the success of a program. 
It also supports the hypothesis #2: the most successful reforms involved the main
actors in looking for the best organizational and behavioral solutions, while the most
drastic cases of reform failure are connected with the State acting as a distributor of
public goods and rents.
Our analysis supports hypothesis set #4: the most successful reforms were
elaborated or at least thoroughly fine-tuned by Poles themselves, so local conditions
had been taken into account and “ownership” of the reform was local. Besides,
interests of potential allies of the reformers were taken into account, and the opponents
were in some way “neutralized.” In the spheres where the reformers failed to do this,
strong interest groups emerged that opposed the continuation of the reform course.
These groups consist of both “early winners” and actors associated with the state-
owned past of privatized enterprises. From this perspective, “local ownership” of
reform failures can be regarded as a disadvantage, because it leads to very strong and
stable dysfunctionalities embedded in the local cultural and political context.
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The analysis supports the hypothesis set #5, contributing to the creation of a model
which describes the influence of the three main groups of actors (“reform advocates,”
“early winners” and “transformation losers” associated with the state-owned sector) on
the reform process, as well as conditions under which reforms pass through the two
critical points (see Section 2). 
In Poland, external factors have been important in shaping the enterprise reform
process, foreign experts helping in identifying the problems that had arisen in the
course of transformation (hypothesis #6b), and foreign firms and foreign direct
investments having a highly positive impact on enterprise reform. But the role that
international institutions have played in constraining the actions of policy makers and
in shaping their thinking about the enterprise sector reforms was far from crucial,
mostly due to the very high degree of their local “ownership.”
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The pension reform was introduced, through a succession of laws, in 1997 and
1998. It was an almost unique example of a political consensus of two successive
governments – SLD and AWS, as the reform was started under the former and was
ultimately implemented under the latter government. It is also an example of reform
motivated not by pressing current concerns and issues, but rather by the consideration
of long-term prospects, and also very thoroughly designed and carefully guided
through the political process. As such it can be treated as successful, although various
problems inevitably arose during its implementation. In our discussion we consider the
success of this reform purely in the sphere of political economy – i.e., the ability of
reformers to win support for the reform and ensure its passage in the legislature and
implementation in practice, and the fact that the reform has not been reversed by later
governments – abstracting from economic and technical questions concerning
difficulties (discussed briefly in section 6.3) arising in computerization, the fiscal
transition costs of partial privatization, etc..
6.1. Legacy
Since the 1950s, Poland had had a comprehensive pension system of the pay-as-
you-go (PAYGO) type (Czepulis-Rutkowska, 1997). Until the late 1980s, the system
retained basic financial stability. However, over time, it acquired sizable deficiencies,
particularly in the form of so-called “branch privileges,” granted to certain professional
groups (army, police, miners, etc.). These were the outcome of the tacit political
pressure of interest groups and the co-opting policies of the authorities. The privileged
groups benefited from earlier retirement age and/or better pension-to-pay ratios. All
other members of the system financed these benefits. During the 1970s, pensions had
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6. Pension reform 
also been granted to the farmers, a sizable part of the population, but who did not pay
into the system. Poland also developed a widespread system of disability pensions.
Since it has been easy to obtain such pensions, they constitute a much larger share of
the whole pension scheme than in most European countries. The whole system has
been administered by the Agency for Social Insurance (ZUS), responsible to the
Ministry of Labor. In 1991, the farmers’ pension program was moved to a separate
Fund for Farmers’ Social Insurance (KRUS). This system is in constant financial strain
and has to be additionally funded by the budget, as many farmers routinely are arrears
with their contributions. 
Already at the late 1980s problems of the liquidity of the whole system started to
show, which prompted to the gradual increase of social security contributions, from
15% of pay in the 1950s to over 35% in the late 1980s (Hausner, 1998). In the early
stages of the transformation, the problems of the pension system became aggravated by
two factors: by inflation and by the policy, described in section 4.4, of massive early
retirement. The situation was aggravated by costly solutions to problems caused by
inflation. They involved indexing and revaluation of pensions granted long before and
thus having smaller real value than pensions received by workers retiring from the
same jobs at later dates. Such was the context the initiative for reform of the system
was born in the mid-1990s.
The first suggestions for radical reforms – in fact, a shift from a PAYGO to a funded
system – were put forward as early as 1991 (Topiński, Wiśniewski, 1995). One of the
initiators, Wojciech Topiński, in his capacity as head of ZUS, visited Chile, was
impressed by the Chilean solutions and tried to promote them at home, but without
success. The debate took off once again a few years later. By then, the overall economic
change was more advanced. Additionally, the World Bank, which played a considerable
role in Poland, became engaged with promoting the change to the funded model all
over the world (World Bank, 1994). 
At this stage, the participants of the debate concentrated not on the immediate
problems of the pension system, but rather on its long-term prospects, related to declining
ratios of working to non-working population, caused in particular by declining fertility
(Golinowska, 1997; Szumlicz, 1999). According to a number of demographic scenarios,
the existing PAYGO system would accumulate problems and ultimately collapse at the
end of the first decade of the 21st century. The idea that it was necessary to introduce
funded systems instead of or in addition to the PAYGO solutions gained acceptance
among social policy experts. As a result, several developed proposals were put forward,
ranging from the radical projects of Finance Ministry experts to more conservative
proposals of Labor Ministry experts (for comparisons, see Golinowska, 1998).
83
UNDERSTANDING REFORM: THE CASE OF POLAND
CASE Reports No. 59
6.2. The Reform
The political decision to go on with the reform was made by the SLD government
in 1996, largely on the initiative of the Finance Minister, Grzegorz Kołodko. The most
important personality behind the efforts to start the reform was the Minister of Labor,
Andrzej Bączkowski, who put unusual effort and commitment into the reform of the
social security system. A lawyer by profession and a Solidarity activist since 1980, he
became Deputy Minister of Labor in 1991, stayed in several cabinets, became chairman
of the Tripartite Commission  and acquired considerable prestige as an exemplary
public servant and good negotiator (Hausner, 1998, 37). He became Minister in
February 1996 and at the same time Government Plenipotentiary for the Reform of
Social Security. After his premature death in November 1996, Jerzy Hausner, a well-
known economist with a record of publications on transformation and a liberal-minded
intellectual-politician close to the SLD, replaced him in this capacity. (With the AWS-
UW coalition victory, Hausner was in turn replaced by Ewa Lewicka.) 
The actual work on the design of the reform was done, between October 1, 1996
and June 1997, by the specially constituted Office of the Government Plenipotentiary
for the Reform of Social Security (Biuro Pełnomocnika Rządu 1997). The way it acted
was unusual for the Polish bureaucracy, and the character of its operation is a factor
explaining the high quality of the design21. It was a hand-picked ad hoc team of
economists and social policy experts, led by Michał Rutkowski, “on loan” from the
World Bank to the Polish government. They were administratively attached to the
Ministry of Labor, but in fact worked without the usual everyday constraints the
permanent members of any bureaucracy feel. Hausner, who both in his theoretical
work on the transformation and in his political activity stresses negotiation and the
“institutionalized cooperation” of opposing interests, provided a political shield (cf.
Hausner, 1995, 324, for the concept of institutionalized cooperation). In the design of
the reform, the team members did not confine themselves to arguing for the necessity
of change and the construction of the new models, but went further, preparing (with
the cooperation of legal advisers) drafts of the necessary new regulations. Moreover,
they did not work in isolation, but – relying on the communication talents of both
Hausner and Rutkowski – were active in preparing ground for understanding of the
new system among the government bureaucracy (particularly ZUS), the
parliamentarians, and even the wider public (cf. Hausner, 2004). 
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The proposed system consisted of three pillars: a reformed PAYGO pillar, a
privately funded pillar which was to become universal and mandatory over time, and
a voluntary privately funded pillar. In the new system, part of the future pension would
come from the reformed PAYGO, and part from the private fund. The choice of the
private fund would be free, and it would be possible to change from one to another. The
change from the old to the new system was supposed to be gradual. Persons over 50
were to stay in the old one (i.e., they participated exclusively in the first pillar), persons
under 30 were required to switch to the new one (i.e., to participate in the second
pillar), and persons in between had a choice between either staying in the old system
and moving to the new system. There were two main arguments in favor of the new
system: it would avoid the type of financial traps characteristic of PAYGO systems, and
it would provide incentives for saving and facilitate the development of financial
markets. There would be, on the other hand, a cost of transition, as there would be a
necessity of both financing the current pensioners (through the old PAYGO system,
until its phasing out) and paying contributions related for the second pillar. These
additional costs were to be financed from privatization revenues. 
The work of pushing the project through the Council of Ministers (cabinet) and
through the parliamentary process was done mostly by Hausner. In early 1997, the
Plenipotentiary was placed directly under the authority of the Prime Minister. This gave
Hausner more leeway, as his responsibilities were now solely for the reform, and not
for the current operation of the social security apparatus. He was also made chairman
of an inter-ministerial task force for the implementation of the reform, which allowed
him to set the intensive pace of work on the final legislation to be processed by the
government and the Sejm. An important part of his activities consisted in winning the
trade unions – and particularly, Solidarity, which was the main component of the AWS
– over to the reform (Hausner, 1999, 40ff.; Hausner, 2004). 
Four of the laws necessary to implement the reform (related mostly to the use of the
funds from privatization) were passed between June and September 1997, still under
the SLD government. The key law on the system of social security was passed under the
AWS-UW coalition, in October 1998. 
6.3. Assessment
It is too early for an assessment of long-term effects of the pension reform, either
in terms of its contribution to the solution of social security problems, or of its influence
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on the development of capital markets. It also has to be noted that, at the early stages
of implementation it stumbled because of logistical problems. The implementation
required setting up individual accounts for every member of the system in the ZUS and
smooth data processing, including transfers of money between the ZUS and the various
private retirement funds. For that, the ZUS needed to improve radically its IT
capacities. It contracted a large Polish company, which for years failed to succeed in
developing the necessary software. Also, more people from the age group of 20-50
decided to join the new system than had been predicted by the authors of the reform,
which put additional financial strain on the ZUS. Finally, it is necessary to add that the
reform did not touch two segments of the social security system which are sources of
constant problems, namely those of disability pensions and farmers’ pensions. Hausner
(2004) says that – given the strength of the Peasant Party (PSL) establishment – any
attempt to deal with the farmers’ pensions was doomed to failure. Leaving these
problems aside, however, it is possible to say that the pension reform was a success,
particularly in comparison with two other major reform efforts of the same period,
those of health and of education, which were reversed by the succeeding governments.
We can point to several factors to explain this relative success:
• Good design. This in itself was a coincidence of several factors. One of them was
a clear model, due to an on-going debate at that time (promoted by the World
Bank in particular) on the desirability and advantages of funded, as opposed to
PAYGO, pension systems. This was in marked contrast to, for example, the health
reform, where no such clear models were at hand. The second factor was the
talent and commitment of the leadership of Polish reforms, particularly of
Bączkowski, Hausner, and Rutkowski. In addition to their personal commitment,
they were able to organize a good team and to persuasively communicate their
ideas to other actors and to the wider public. The third factor was the design of
the working team itself, created as a task force independent, in practice, from the
government bureaucracy, and also having a clear “exit strategy,” as they were
supposed to terminate their work quickly upon the completion of the program.
Incidentally, this sheds a certain light upon the effectiveness of the Polish public
administration, the topic of section 3.1, as the pension reform – in a way similar
to the macroeconomic reform, also a successful one – was designed not by a
standing bureaucracy, but by experts who were, to a large extent, outside both the
bureaucracy and the party system.
• Coalition of supporters and allies. There were a number of actors who had a stake
in the success of reforms (Golinowska, 1998). They included the local experts, the
foreign experts, the international financial institutions (World Bank, the IMF) and
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– last but not least – the emerging private pension funds. The latter, through their
aggressive (and probably very costly) promotional campaigns, took upon
themselves the task of accustoming the wider public to the new system.  
• Lack of powerful opponents. Although the pensioners were a powerful political
force in Poland, their immediate interests were in no way threatened by the
reform. Also, contrary to the health reform and the education reform, in the case
of pensions there were no lobbies of service providers blocking the reform process
in the name of status quo (Nelson, 1998). The ZUS administration was not
particularly enthusiastic about the project, but it did not oppose it (Golinowska,
1998). There was some opposition among legal circles, who saw funded systems
as “not social security” – but the views of the economists prevailed (Golinowska,
1998, 21; Hausner, 1998, 37).
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Hypothesis 1. Participatory vs. technocratic approaches: importance of “match” or
“balance”
We hypothesized that one of the key factors in the political economy of reform
success is the degree of match between technocratic or participatory approach
compatibility and the degree to which it is in fact implemented using either a
technocratic or participatory approach, and that reforms are successful where there is
a good match. This occurs when, for example, reforms of a largely technical nature are
carried out in a technocratic manner, and reforms requiring a more participatory
approach are implemented as decentralized learning processes on the basis of
negotiation, with the participation of various social actors. Unsuccessful reforms, on the
other hand, are observed where there is a mismatch or an improper balance between
the role of technocratic concerns and the role of the interests of various social actors. 
We have argued that the successful Polish experience with the initial stabilization
and liberalization reform package is evidence in favor of our first hypothesis – that it
represents a success of the “technocratic” process in preparing a reform of a very
technical nature. On the other hand, we have also noted that it was unfortunate that a
greater effort to educate Polish society about the goals of the reforms and the nature of
the market economy was not undertaken.
While reforms of a largely technical nature, such as macroeconomic stabilization
and liberalization, consist of parameter setting by a small group of central institutions
such as the finance ministry or the central bank, successful enterprise sector reforms
require a highly participatory and decentralized approach, because the actors involved
are very numerous and located throughout the economy22. Such an approach was
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7. Conclusions
22 Of course, mass privatization can and has been carried out in a centralized manner (e.g., in the Czech
Republic), but the consensus seems to be that this has been the least successful method of privatization
in the post-Communist countries. See, for example, Błaszczyk et al. (eds., 2003).
crucial for the progress made in the first five years of the Polish transformation in the
area of privatization, when the vast majority of privatizations were management-
employee buyouts (privileged employee access to shares was also important in winning
employee approval for privatization by trade sales and IPOs). It was similarly crucial
for the success of the Polish program for restructuring of banks’ bad loan portfolios, in
which banks and enterprises were the main actors and participated in a learning
process, as opposed to the centralized, and much less successful, approach adopted in
the Czech Republic and Hungary. Failure to achieve a proper degree, scope and
character of participation led, for example, to suboptimal results of some privatization
paths and methods (the most drastic example are numerous unfinished cases of
indirect privatization) and most of the restructuring programs. On the other hand,
technical aspects of reforms must not be neglected, otherwise the involvement of even
highly relevant sets of actors will not be able to ensure the success of a program.
Technical inadequacy was one of the main causes for sub-optimal results of some
methods and paths of privatization (mainly indirect ones, such as the failure to resolve
a number of technical questions in the course of privatization of largest enterprises and
flaws in the NIF mass privatization program), as well as of certain restructuring
programs. 
The success23 of the pension reform was due in large measure to the ability to find
the appropriate balance between technocratic and participatory approaches. The
pension reform, although technically complicated, had a strong participatory aspect, as
major attention was devoted by the reformers to involving a large number of groups in
the preparation of the reforms (so that large numbers of parliamentarians, ministers
and trade unionists felt themselves to be “co-owners” of the reform) and in the creation
of new groups of social actors (private pension funds); of course, the population was
empowered as well (by being given the opportunity to make choices about their funds
and, in the case of persons aged 30-50, to make a choice whether to join the new system
or not). However, the reform also included a large, effectively organized “technocratic”
component which was crucial in assuring the quality of reform design.
Thus, with respect to the first hypothesis, we conclude that it should be
reformulated: it is not a question of “matching” a given approach (participatory or
technocratic) with a given reform, as reforms are generally of a complex nature, and
various aspects of any given reform require various approaches. Thus, for any given
reform, an appropriate “mix” or “balance” of the two approaches would seem to be
necessary for success. 
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23 This success was a political success. It is too early to judge the degree of success of this reform in economic
terms.
Hypothesis 2. The successful participatory approach as a learning process
Our analysis of reforms in the enterprise sector shows how the most spectacular suc-
cesses and failures in this area in Poland support this hypothesis. The most successful
reforms engaged the main actors in looking for the best organizational and behavioral
solutions, while the state limited its role to setting of the general framework of learning
activity and acted as a referee (as in the bank and enterprises restructuring program and
many cases of consensual privatization). The most drastic cases of reform failure are
connected with the state acting as a distributor of public goods and rents (as in the JSSPs
or sectoral restructuring programs). At the same time, in order to meet the goals of the
reforms, the proper set of actors must be chosen and they must be forced to act within
a certain institutionalized framework. Otherwise, interest groups emerge whose goals
often contradict the goals of the reforms. This can be seen, for example, in the case of
entrenched managers in many management-employee owned companies, and members
of the supervisory boards of the JSSPs. The worst situation occurs when an improper
choice of actors is combined with the highly distributive role of the State. In such
situations, clientelism and the entrenchment of actors reach their apogee (e.g., JSSPs;
the role of the Ministry of the Treasury in privatization and enterprise restructuring
during the last few years; failure to restructure some sectors, e.g., mining).
The case of reform of the judiciary also supports this hypothesis. Here, role of the
social actors (in this case, judges) was not construed at the beginning of the reform
process as a learning one within a partnership relationship, but rather as one in which
they would simply use their “voice” to make demands. As a result, these actors have
blocked further reform in this area.
Hypothesis 3. The missing link: Early public sector reform 
Our analysis of the civil service reform and the justice system reform supports our
hypothesis # 3, namely that the failure of reformers in the early stage to appreciate the
importance of public sector reform led to stagnation later. Failure to develop a civil
service and an effective administration of justice seriously diminished state capacity
(including its market supporting role) in terms of its ability to reconstruct institutions
through the introduction of new regulations, as well as to effectively monitor and
enforce the functioning of existing institutions.
Many of the problems of the Polish privatization process can also be linked to the
failure to create a well-paid, apolitical and professional civil service which could have
managed the process in the ministry. The high rate of turnover of ministry personnel
and the high level of politicization of that personnel have led to many delays in the
privatization of large, valuable enterprises, which have often been held in limbo in the
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intermediate JSSP stage, where political appointees have been able to hold lucrative
posts on both supervisory and executive boards. The lack of continuity has also been
partially responsible for a stop-and-go dynamic which has been observable in the pace
of privatization, as during long periods following each new government’s taking office
privatization comes to a virtual halt.
Hypothesis 4a. The importance of “local ownership”
One of the key factors of mostly successful general course of Polish transition
(especially when compared to most other post-Communist countries) is the fact that
almost every reform was elaborated or at least thoroughly fine-tuned by Poles
themselves, so local conditions had been taken into account and “ownership” of the
reform was local. In spite of the important role played by foreign advisers including
Jeffrey Sachs and representatives of international financial institutions, the Polish
stabilization and liberalization reform package was a Polish product. This fact
constitutes a great success whose importance cannot be overestimated, because part of
the initial conditions and inherited baggage of the past referred to in our formulation
of the hypothesis was the post-Communist countries’ shortage of trained professionals
competent to understand the issues involved and design and implement such a
program (a shortage which was much more severe – in some cases amounting to a
complete lack of such persons – in many countries of the former Soviet Union). 
In the area of enterprise reforms, not only did Poland elaborate its own original
privatization concepts, but sometimes (as in the case of bank and enterprises
restructuring program) foreign solutions were rejected in favor of locally designed
solutions (moreover, in this case, we would argue that this locally designed solution was
in fact superior to the foreign solution). Similarly, the fact that “local ownership” of the
reform was clearly maintained was a key factor in the success of the social security
system reform.
Hypothesis 4b. The policy maker’s need for allies 
The whole privatization concept in Poland was build on the understanding the
necessity to take into account interests of potential allies of the reformers (or at least
“neutralize” potential “enemies”). One country-specific feature consisted in the
important role of trade unions and employee self-management. Where these
institutions acted as allies of the restructuring and privatization process, the reforms
were faster and smoother (as in MEBO companies and other successful privatization
deals as well as the bank and enterprises restructuring program) than in cases where
their interests contradicted the goals of the reform programs (i.e., most restructuring
programs, JSSPs). 
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In the case of the pension reform, we observed the emphasis the reformers put on
taking into account the interests of potential allies and winning them over to the
reform. One very important such ally was in the financial sector, which was responsible
for the creation of the private pension funds making up the second and third pillars
(trade unions also enjoyed the possibility of participating in the creation of pension
funds).
Hypothesis 4c. Reforms must be compatible with the local context
We have observed difficulties in reform implementation when efforts have been
made to transplant foreign solutions without taking the conditions of the Polish context
sufficiently into account. In the case of civil service, introducing legal-rational
structures based on professional skills and merit was difficult given the inadequate pool
of potential personnel and in view of the entrenched habits of social interaction based
upon personal relations. In the case of the administration of justice, the introduction of
a far-fledged independence of judges, based on the Anglo-Saxon model, did not take
into account the fact that the traditions and institutions were not in place which would
safeguard the responsibility of the judges. 
On the other hand, we also have to note that two of the most positive developments
in the area of enterprise reform have occurred where it proved possible to successfully
transplant foreign models and experience into the Polish economy. These were the
cases of privatization by commercial methods in which enterprises were sold to foreign
investors (in such cases, restructuring and investment has been carried out with much
greater intensity than in any other group of Polish enterprises) and the overall process
of implementation of the Continental model of corporate governance. 
Hypothesis 4d. The danger of re-constitution of old interest groups 
Socialist industry and the planning apparatus which ran it were characterized by
branch interest groups whose structure (even if sometimes informal) was a corporatist
nature. This was particularly true of mining and heavy industry (but also, for example,
the textile industry), where enterprise directors, the official trade unions and ministry
officials together formed powerful lobbies which exerted great influence on the
resource allocation decisions of the central authorities. While these interest groups
disintegrated in the initial shock of the end of the central planning system, we have
observed a tendency in all post-Communist countries for them to reconstitute
themselves. This poses a threat to the reform process. Overcoming them is crucial for
development of efficient corporate governance and market behavior of enterprises,
optimal goals and priorities setting. 
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Hypothesis 5. The importance of keeping “early winners” at bay
In Poland, a large number of powerful “early winner” interest groups emerged
(especially after the reform slowdown of the mid-1990s), many of which are interested in
defending their privileged positions (e.g., by controlling the legislative and decision-
making processes at the parliament and government level, creating and keeping
monopolies, etc.) rather than the level playing field of a liberal market economy. These
groups include, for example, entrenched groups of politicians and bureaucrats, trade
union leaders (at the national level) etc. Another important group consists of certain very
rich businessmen who have obtained their status due to good political connections, fierce
lobbying and even criminal activity. At the level of enterprises (especially state-owned
ones or where there was no substantial progress in corporate governance restructuring,
such as JSSPs and some MEBO companies), the most important such group consists of
managers, for whom further reforms may mean deterioration of their opportunities for
asset stripping and tunneling. In the public sector, judges constitute a good example of
this group, having one extraordinarily far-reaching independence at the outset of the
transition. Similarly, judges, as a result of their gains (with respect to independence) in
the early reform period, were able to organize themselves as a rent-seeking group which
was successful in blocking further reform. (This is related to hypothesis # 2 as well, since
the role of the social actors – in this case, judges – was not construed as a learning one
within a partnership relationship, but rather as one in which they would simply use their
“voice” to make demands.) As a result of their gains in the early reform period, such
groups have been able to organize themselves as a rent-seeking group which was
successful in blocking further reform. On the one hand, the existence of these groups is a
guarantee that there can be no return to the classic socialist economy with state
ownership and central planning. However, these groups tend to block reform progress
which would bring the country to the “critical mass” at which those interested in a liberal
and competitive economy and rule of law are stronger than those favoring “crony
capitalism” and similar syndromes that tend to characterize most transition economies.
In Poland, transformation losers consisted of groups linked with the state sector,
such as employees of SOEs in the “sensitive” sectors, and those employee council
members and trade union functionaries who were unable to find places for themselves
in privatized companies.
None of the transition countries, including Poland, seems to have been able to
overcome the low level equilibrium described in section 2.2 and move beyond the R2
point (although apparently Poland is much closer to the R3 point than many other post-
Communist countries, especially FSU states), which is the real “critical mass” point of
post-Communist reforms. 
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These observations lead us to the tentative conclusion that rather than a
breakthrough taking a country rapidly from the R2 equilibrium to the R3 equilibrium,
we should expect at best a set of incremental changes in the balance of powers between
the three groups (mostly changes in the composition and behavior of the early winners
group) which permit a gradual move in this direction. There will be no more “windows
of opportunity” or “extraordinary politics” in the transition countries, barring
unforeseeable extraordinary circumstances. Thus, the only option available is gradual
progress, which can be attained by pursuing two strategies simultaneously. One is a
“stick” approach consisting of constant pressure on the interest groups blocking
reforms (both the “early winners” of the transition period and the re-constituted
corporatist groups of the ancien regime), in an attempt to contain their advances or
even roll them back to some extent when it is possible. The other is a “carrot,”
consisting of efforts to find ways to link the interests of small groups of the reform-
blocking coalition with a reform agenda and bring them into the reform camp,
enlarging it and diminishing the anti-reform coalition at the same time. 
Hypothesis 6a. Diminishing role of EU and NATO membership prospects over time
Unfortunately, the reform areas covered by our research have been practically
unaffected by EU and NATO membership prospects, and thus we were unable to test
this hypothesis. The exception is in the area of monetary policy. The fact that monetary
policy has remained on a more or less restrictive course and the independence of the
monetary authorities not seriously challenged is probably due in large measure to the
constraints imposed by the international environment, in which Poland’s status as a
borrower and candidate for EU membership would have been threatened by serious
policy reversals in this area. 
Hypothesis 6b. The role of international institutions
We have seen that in the sphere of public administration (civil service) and the
administration of justice, the failure to reform was linked to the low level of pressure
or advice from international institutions to reform existing institutions. In contrast, the
very active role of the World Bank was critical in the success of the social security
system reform (at the same time, “local ownership” of the reform was clearly
maintained, in support of hypothesis 4a). 
International institutions have also played an important role in constraining the
actions of policy makers as well as in shaping their thinking about both the content of
the enterprise sector reforms and the manner of their implementation (sequencing,
methods applied, etc.). The research showed that foreign experts also helped a lot in
identifying the problems that had arisen in the course of transformation and had been
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caused by reforms themselves (as in the case of the restructuring of banks’ bad debt
portfolios).
Hypothesis 6c. The role of the international business cycle
Poland’s transformational recession at the outset of the 1990s was deeper and
longer than the reformers had expected, largely due to unforeseen external
circumstances such as the collapse of the CMEA and the Soviet Union in prolonging
the recession, but also because this period was not a favorable one in the world
economy, with both the United States and Japan moving into recession. A better
situation in the world economy would have probably helped Poland’s economy recover
faster and make the reforms more popular. This seems to have been the case for Turgut
Özal in Turkey and Viktor Yushchenko in Ukraine – their reforms, carried out in the
early 1980s and the late 1990s, respectively, were accompanied by favorable external
conditions and their popularity was much greater than that of Leszek Balcerowicz.
Additional conclusions suggested by the analysis
Our research points to a number of conclusions concerning issues which were not
touched on in our hypotheses. We would like to deal with these briefly at this point.
Our research suggests that the impulse for reform initiatives often comes from the
presence of a crisis situation. Thus, for example, near-hyperinflation seems to have
been a necessary condition for Balcerowicz package, and the bank loan portfolio crisis
a necessary condition for the enterprise and bank restructuring program. Similarly, the
lack of tangible crisis could be seen as a reason for the lack of civil service reform.
There are, however, exceptions, for example in the justice system, which is certainly in
crisis, but in which reform is nevertheless blocked by the judges’ lobby and the fact that
the current fiscal crisis limits the funding available for investments (e.g., in
computerization of courts and police). Also, in this case, the logic of collective action
described by Mancur Olson seems to be relevant: the small lobby of judges has a
stronger incentive to retain the status quo than the large body of citizens that would
benefit from reform has to actively work for reform. Another exception can be found in
the pension reform, which was undertaken despite the fact that a crisis situation, while
inevitable if the pay-as-you-go system had remained unreformed, was still in the distant
future at the time.
Regarding the role of various actors in the reform process, our observations of
reform opponents suggest that it is important to distinguish between rhetoric and
action. The former is usually much more radical than the latter. To date, no one in
power has ever radically revised the reforms undertaken at the beginning of the Polish
transition. In general, there seems to be rather a gradual erosion than a
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“counterrevolution” (this should have implications for the theory of the “critical mass”
or “point of no return”).
On a related subject, political instability seems to be more important for the
implementation (especially the pace) of reforms than for their content (design). People
have often come into office intending to implement new policies and programs but
ended up implementing ones that had been elaborated by the previous administration.
The effect of this has been to slow the pace rather than alter the content of the reforms.
Another interesting observation is that a change in the ruling party is not necessary
for reform reversals, which have sometimes been initiated by the same groups earlier
responsible for reform policies.
Finally, a factor that seems to underlie the success or failure of the reforms
examined here is the quality of leadership. We cannot find an example of a successful
Polish reform without a leader who pushed it through. Such a leader must have a vision
of change and a commitment to that change and be able to convince the appropriate
parties to support, or at least not hinder, the reform. The strengths and weaknesses of
such leaders are crucial. Balcerowicz, at the time of the initial stabilization and
liberalization package, lacked a talent for communicating his vision to the society, but
had the necessary vision and was able to pick a team which operationalized and
implemented it. The strengths and weaknesses of later reform leaders differed to a
greater or lesser extent, but the common denominator is their presence as the spiritus
movens of the reform effort.
Suggestions for further research
One question which we believe would be interesting for further research concerns
the importance of good institutions for reform success. On the basis of the Polish
experience, there seems to be reason to believe that this importance may differ with
respect to the stage of the reform process at which a country finds itself. Institutions
may be more important for sustainability than for the quality of reform package content
at an early stage (as in the case of the Polish stabilization and liberalization reforms,
which succeeded in spite of the very low level of development of market institutions at
the outset of the Polish transition), but become more important for the quality of reform
packages in later stages.
As we have discussed above, all post-Communist countries face the problem of
breaking the low-level equilibrium represented by the R2 point in Figure 2.1. An
interesting question relates to the policy measures that may be most effective in dealing
with this problem, including a wide range of measures aimed at improving the
government’s credibility and support for reforms. Among the reforms that may be of
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particular importance here we can list improvements in the conditions for the private
sector of economy, especially small and medium sized new entrants; improvements in
the legal system in order to minimize the illegitimate gains of early winners, and
reallocation of public expenditures to raise the efficiency of social programs and safety
nets (thus better compensating losers). The problem is, however, that the early winners’
influence on the government and the parliament is so strong (those institutions being
to a large extent captured by these groups) that by the time policy makers begin to
consider these measures, it may be too late. 
Additionally, one might want to identify factors whose presence could reduce the
gains of the early winners who capture and thwart the reform process, possibly
encouraging some of them to transfer to the “reform advocates” group. These factors
could include:
– economic crisis caused by insufficient or ill-designed reforms or a shock from
external markets, which threatens the gains of the early winners and may produce a
situation in which at least some actors can defend their gains by supporting the reform
continuation (at least to some extent);
– external pressure exerted by international financial institutions and membership
in international organizations (WTO, NATO, EU etc.  –  both at the stage of seeking for
membership and membership itself), which may force the government to introduce
some reforms against the will of the early winners, which may force the latter to adapt
to the new situation, among others looking for gains by switching to the reform
advocates group; 
– evolutionary changes of opportunity costs for early winners, when the reform
hold-up becomes less promising than reform continuation (at least to some extent); for
example, entrenched entrepreneurs, who benefit from special treatment from the
government, may expect gains from freeing themselves from its intervention which
exceed the losses caused by withdrawal of the special treatment they enjoy under a less
liberal regime.
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